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ABSTRACT
LOOKING THROUGH WHITENESS:
OBJECTIVITY, RACISM, METHOD,
AND RESPONSIBILITY
Philip Thomas Langlois Mack, A.B., M.A.
Marquette University, 2022
Does a white philosopher have anything of value to offer to the
philosophy of race and racism? If this philosophical subfield must embrace
subjective experience, why should we value the perspective of white
philosophers whose racial identity is often occluded by racial normativity and
who lack substantive experiences of being on the receiving end of racism?
Further, if we should be committed to experience, in what sense can the
philosophy of race and racism be “objective”? What should that word mean?
Tackling this question first, “objective” should at least mean general, that
the ideas of the literature can be coherently integrated. An objective take on
racism brings together a plurality of perspectives. What’s wrong with just a
plurality of satellite ideas? It implies a fragmented approach to ameliorating
racism, where different specialists have different recommendations. How can
racism, generally, be lessened? If major views of racism are unifiable, then we
have a general method to ameliorate racism.
This project might appear tone-deaf: a white philosopher unifying things
by reducing ideas to some central notion. But this unity isn’t about reducing
things but rather integrating them in a way that respects difference. Yet, there’s a
reason we should be interested in the white perspective. Whites can speak about
racism from a participatory perspective. If whites are knowledgeable, and believe
themselves to have no implicit bias, they may suppose they’re “beyond” racism
or no longer at risk for perpetuating it. I explore this idea in a psychologically
realistic way via my notion of overlooking, where ameliorating racism from the
white perspective is an ongoing project.
I end by considering how racism is applicable to other philosophical ideas
beyond its typical or circumscribed purview. Here, I re-frame responsibility,
arguing that we needn’t be forced to choose between responsibility models
divided into individual versus social camps. We ought to instead think of
responsibility in terms of power, which provides a realistic lens by which
persons and groups are held to account. In being more generally convincing, it
might actually get folks to take responsibility where they might not otherwise—
theory in service of praxis.
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Chapter 1
Walking Tightropes: Charting a Path Replete with Tensions
…Sullivan discusses what we might call the white liberal double bind. This is the situation that
well-intentioned white people find themselves in when they sincerely want to deal productively
with race-related issues but seem condemned to screw up no matter what they do.
Paul C. Taylor (2007, 202)
Our craving for generality…[is also]…the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, 18)

1. Whither Philosophy and the White Philosopher?
Permit me to bombard you, reader, with a deluge of questions. Is it
appropriate that white people participate in the philosophy of race and racism,
especially given that the experience of racism is often missing for them? Can they
do philosophy of race and racism? Perhaps so, perhaps not. Suppose it is
appropriate. Suppose they can do it. What then, if anything, can a white
philosopher (for instance, this author) have to say about issues the field
discusses?
Bolder yet, can a white philosopher say anything objective about race and
racism?1 On its face, it would appear to be, prima facie, implausible that white
philosophers have anything to offer the philosophy of race and racism seeing as
there are good reasons to respect and think through particular subjective
perspectives, especially nonwhite perspectives, where it comes to race and

As I explain throughout this chapter, and in chapter 2, “objectivity” here means a general,
common ground from which anyone can proceed and to which anyone can in principle agree. I
will complicate and expand this notion soon enough.
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racism.2 So, should this project stop now before it goes any further? Am I
doomed by that which is expressed in this chapter’s first epigraph? Am I a
pretender to the field, attempting to answer questions that I have at best no
business investigating and at worst no way of sincerely entertaining? The burden
is on white philosophers to justify how it is that their particular experience of
whiteness or white identity is relevant to the production of philosophical
knowledge pertaining to race and racism. This dissertation, in some ways, offers
an initial foray into charting this ground. But equally important, who I am is
relevant to writing this particular dissertation. It is made possible because I am
white.
But what of philosophy itself? Of what value can philosophy be in this
discussion? Does philosophy in its “traditional” sense—seeking universal,
timeless truths—have anything to contribute to a conversation about race and
racism? The local, historicized nature of race and racism would seem to preclude
that entirely. This tension is grounded by Charles W. Mills’ (2012) point that
“traditional” philosophical inquiry’s experiential starting point can be
understood to be white (60).3 He writes that
…the conception of the discipline itself is inimical to the recognition of
race. Philosophy is supposed to be abstracting away from the contingent,
the corporeal, the temporal, the material, to get at necessary, spiritual,
eternal, ideal truths. Because race as a topic is manifestly not one of those
eternal truths…it is handicapped from the start…. Philosophy aspires to
These reasons are briefly spelled out below and in more detail in chapter 2.
He notes that this is especially true of political philosophy (61-63, 65). Indeed, his point is that
even in this sub-field of philosophy where we might expect to find an emphasis on the
particulars of political life (e.g., as historically and locally contextualized), we find instead a
striving for clean, abstract, “colorless” ideals (61).
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the universal, whereas race is necessarily local, so that the unraced
(whites) become the norm (60).
He later notes that
[w]ithout a willingness to face how seemingly colorless abstraction is
really generalization from the white experience, the discipline’s
exclusions, both demographic and theoretical, can only perpetuate
themselves (65).
If my experience as a white person is relevant to the investigation of race and
racism, and yet I want to aim for a general philosophical approach to the field,
then instead of abstracting away in a “colorless” fashion, I will need to sincerely
confront, and not evade, the sorts of issues Mills sets forth.
So, is a “generalist” approach—putting together the various ideas in the
literature clearly and coherently— therefore doomed in the face of issues that are
particular by definition? How are white philosophers to confront the challenges
Mills sets forth? Perhaps there is a middle ground where the fruits of
particularity interweave with the descriptive simplicity of pointing out what is
common. Couldn’t it be coherent to crave generality without a contempt for the
particular? If it is, might there be something we can learn about racism in general
that isn’t only about a narrow, specialized problem in the field—e.g., active
ignorance, implicit bias, intentional hatred, bad faith, and so on?
The foregoing is in part the motivation for treating philosophy in this
dissertation as an ameliorative activity in the spirit of American pragmatism. We
need a plausible path forward, yet one that is attentive to differences at the level
of the particular (e.g., experience, location, history, and so on). I understand
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philosophy’s ameliorative function as both reflexive and practical. By its
“reflexive” function I mean that philosophical analysis should “look at” itself
and self-correct for the purpose of avoiding its pitfalls. In the context of this
dissertation, this unfolds both in terms of the white philosopher’s self-analysis as
a white philosopher—what we can do and what we ought to do when theorizing
about race and racism—as well as whether philosophy itself can still aspire to
something objective in the face of the localized nature of some of the problems it
addresses (e.g., race and racism). Philosophy’s ameliorative function as
“practical” means that philosophical activity ought to attempt to make our lives
better and that philosophers ought to act as functionaries of humanity.4
I raise the distinction between reflexive and practical functions for two
reasons. First, it is meant to clarify that amelioration does not solely have to do
with improving the conditions of real life. Part of my point is that philosophical
theorizing can itself be made better for the purpose of addressing problems that it
is, under certain conceptions, not particularly well-suited to address (as we have
seen above vis-à-vis Mills).5 Second, in the context of racism, we should not be
too quick to suggest that amelioration will “solve” the problem of racism. I take
seriously Derrick Bell’s (1992) “racism is permanent” thesis (373-374). Bell sets
forth this thesis so as to combat the tendency of our thinking that racism can be

But see note 24 of this chapter where I complicate the notion of practical in juxtaposition to
praxis. I expand on the notion of philosophers as “functionaries of humanity” in section 3.
5 Chapter 2 of this dissertation attempts to perform exactly this task by offering a meta-theoretical
approach to analyses of racism in order to show that one need not clear away the contingencies
and particularities of race and racism in order to be able to say something general, yet
productive, about racism, thus confronting the challenge presented above from Mills.
4
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overcome, as this tends to overdetermine plausible solutions to racism. Instead,
Bell suggests that we find value in struggle and not in overcoming. This matters
in the context of this project because I am not suggesting that amelioration
requires or entails a complete solution to the problem of racism. We just need to
do better.
The final consideration I want to raise by way of introduction is as
follows. Beyond the domain of racism proper, suppose there is something to
learn from racism as a general position—that is, as a philosophical method. Might it
help our thinking about other intractable philosophical problems? If we gather
up the lessons and insights derived from philosophical work on racism, we
might be able to extend to other areas of philosophical thought more generally,
using the problem of racism, in a sense, as an approach. As a social-historical
phenomenon, racism betrays strict categorization into one of either the
individual or the social/structural, and yet we presumably want to capture both
for a full expression of the phenomenon. But capturing both levels of analysis
extends far beyond the domain of racism to other areas where lines are blurred.
Is making things right where racism is concerned a matter of changing the minds
of racists, or is it a matter of upending the structures that reify racism? Does the
one bear on the other? How? And how might the slipperiness of the
individual/social-structural binary impact our thinking about the moral idea of
responsibility, where structural and collective harms are not so neatly tied to
individuals and vice versa?
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2. Contextualizing Tensions
This section names and makes explicit the tensions just presented for the
purpose of situating this chapter and the dissertation more generally. It charts a
path replete with tensions which this dissertation, as if walking a tightrope,
attempts to maneuver. The point is to introduce some overarching themes the
dissertation addresses and to set the stage for a discussion of method—how to
maneuver the tensions and address its themes.
Objectivity/Generality, Subjectivity/Particularity
It matters that we ask what the role of the white philosopher is in the
philosophy of race and racism, and whether it is appropriate, because it is not
straightforwardly clear that white people have the epistemic access that
oppressed persons of color do regarding racism. Indeed, “not straightforwardly
clear” may be putting it lightly. It is probably the case that whites by and large do
not have that access, at least to the extent that persons of color do.6 It matters also
that we ask whether a white philosopher can say anything objective because as a
matter of method most of the field takes a perspectival approach, embracing
experience. Both issues should be of interest to any white philosopher working in
this area. We (white people) need to confront the issues honestly and carefully.

Of course, this is not to argue that white people do not experience class-based, sexual or gender,
or other forms of oppression. It is to say, however, that the experience of racial oppression is often
missing. I do not mean to overplay the lack of experience whites have on being on the receiving
end of racism. Surely some have encountered some form of oppression and can relate in a way to
racism as experienced by persons of color. A lifetime of accumulated experiences with some form
of oppression likely develops a kind of empathy or moral imagination as concerns racism.
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So, why is it that these problems run so deep? The white philosopher’s
legitimacy is challenged by a constellation of issues. Perhaps the most important
intellectual predecessor here is W. E. B. Du Bois (1986) who argues that white
minds are conditioned by “long followed habits” of white supremacy calcified in
their environments (679). The notion of habit continues to play an important role
in the philosophy of racism. Beyond their underscoring the maintenance of white
supremacy and superiority (often unnoticed) habits of privilege and whiteness
are thought to obscure what whites can know about race and racism (Sullivan
2006; MacMullan 2009). This white epistemic obscurity is drawn out by Mills’
(1997) “epistemology of ignorance”, the view that whites actively keep
themselves “in the dark” about racial issues so as to maintain a racist status quo.
If I keep myself from knowing, then there is nothing to see, and thus nothing for
me to do. The payoff is that I get to keep all the privileges afforded to me by that
(unjust) status quo. Worse yet, whites may not know that they do not know
about relations of racial oppression (a so-called “meta-ignorance”), and in line
with maintaining the status quo, they may want or need to keep it that way
(Medina 2013, 35). This cluster of thought is amusingly captured by Terrance
MacMullan (2015):
…when a white philosopher writes about whiteness, he or she
says…“Hey! You should listen to what I have to say about race and
whiteness” and then almost invariably explicitly states…that white folks
suffer from deep ignorance when it comes to race and racism (“One of the
things I have to say about race is that white people, like me, don’t know
what the heck we are saying when we talk about race!”) (647).
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Now, the more provocative element of this tension is that between a white
philosopher’s ability to say something objective about racism and the
perspectivalism presupposed in much of the literature. Prima facie, there seems
no way around this. “The white man,” says Frantz Fanon (1952), “is locked in his
whiteness” (xiii). If we are predominantly bound by our subjective perspectives,
then there seems to be no clear route towards saying anything objective at all,
where being objective means thinking from a detached, decontextualized
standpoint. It is precisely the notion of perspective, of course, that is the challenge
here. Whiteness is a perspective from which I understand the world around me
(Frankenberg 1993, 1; hooks 1989, 113). But if this is so, and whites are often
missing the experience of racial oppression, then it seems likely that whites
cannot fully understand what racism is like, much less offer an objective take on
it.
So, what is to be said about this often-missing experience and whether
white philosophers can say something objective about race and racism, both at all
and without homogenizing the discussion as warned against by Mills (2012)?
Let’s begin unpacking this by clarifying the sense of “experience” in this project
before moving on to complicate the notion of “objectivity” in relation to
subjectivity and particularity.
I use the term perspective (or “subjective perspective”) to denote two kinds
of experience: (1) subjective experience and (2) experience-based knowledge. Whereas
(1) signifies one’s first-person conscious experiences, (2) signifies an epistemic
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feature of experience—the knowledge garnered from one’s experience. One’s
subjective experience (1) will vary depending on one’s race. And one’s
experience-based knowledge (2) will vary too, as it depends on the experiential
differences based on one’s race. Thus, one’s experience-based knowledge is
going to be perspectival—i.e., different to others’ experience-based knowledge.
My point is that it is not merely, or even predominately, an experiential difference
that is at stake here, but that it is an epistemic difference based on those
experiential differences. So, all I mean by a perspective (or “subjective
perspective”)7 is an experience-based knowledge.
Now, how is the abovementioned notion of perspective supposed to work
in tandem with objectivity, especially where we do not want to erase raced-based
perspectives? I propose carving out a middle ground where objectivity and
raced-based perspectives are retainable. But doing so requires problematizing
and complicating the notions of objectivity, subjectivity, and particularity.8 We may
rightly want to avoid, methodologically, holding stalwartly to either
subjectivity/particularity or a “traditional” sense of objectivity.9
To see why, let’s continue situating the discussion by re-raising the
following question: what is the role of philosophy here? Given that the
prevailing methodologies in the philosophy of race and racism belie generality, is

I will use the terms “perspective” and “subjective perspective” interchangeably.
Conspicuously absent from this list is the notion of generality, but the reader will soon find that
generality is included in the sense of “objectivity” I offer in this section and below in section 3.
9 The “traditional” sense I have in mind is that against which Mills (2012, 60-65) warns—that it
means a pure, “ideal” and timeless truth divorced from the messy particulars of the real world.
7
8
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there room for a generalist—someone who wants to objectively integrate
things—in the philosophy of race and racism? Can philosophy aspire to anything
general in this area? We may not want to offer a full-throated generality, as it
may come in tow with a simplistic reduction, the implication of which is doing
away with the perspectives of philosophers of color who theorize from the
oppressed perspective.
Now, although it would be inaccurate to say that all race theorists share
the same methodology, I think it is fair to say that nearly all of them begin and
end at particularity of some sort—an approach we can call methodological
particularism. Sometimes that means concentrating on particularized experiences
(Gordon 1995; Jones 2009, 31-33, 36; Alcoff 2012, 36; Mills 2012, 60-65; Kim 2014;
MacMullan 2015, 646; Lee 2020). Elsewhere it amounts to a specified
concentration on a particular time and location: an Anglo-American politic (Mills
1997, 2017) or legal history (López 2006), the historical residue of apartheid in
South Africa (Vice 2010), vestiges of colonial whiteness as an educational norm
and as “elite” in Nigeria (Ayling 2019), historical processes (Roediger 1991, 2002,
Allen 2012a, 2012b; Yancy 2012, 5), or social location in the United States (Alcoff
2006, 9; Sullivan 2006, 3; Yancy 2008, xvi; MacMullan 2009, 1-2). I could go on,
but one gets the point.
Now, there is nothing wrong with particularity per se. But what results
from a singular commitment to particularity is a proliferation of predominantly
independent, satellite theories of racism. The literature becomes fragmented,
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obfuscating our understanding of racism, a consequence we might rightly want
to avoid. But as noted before, we should not be too quick to dismiss particularity,
as that runs the risk of doing away with first-person perspectives. It would be a
mistake, for instance, to clean things up by offering a reductive theory of racism,
that racism is, or boils down to, x, whatever “x” may be.
Yet, if subjectivity and particularity are embraced, then that likely implies
a commitment to epistemic and moral relativism. That race and racism are so
historicized and localized, it might make sense to suppose that we ought to
theorize only from race-based perspectives. But if this is our only route, then
there is no principled basis on which to say racism is morally objectionable. If it
is all relative, then how is it that we can stake that claim? Clearly, if we cannot
say racism is morally objectionable, then something has gone wrong with our
account of racism (as against the background of subjectivity/particularity). More
still, there would seem to be little to no common ground on which we can agree
about the problems of race and racism, if it is true that we should theorize only
from our perspectives.
But the traditional sense of “objectivity” does not do much better. Suppose
we commit to the notion. It would likely follow, then, that no subjective
perspectives matter at all. We may proceed thinking that raced experiences only
get in the way of our arriving at the “Truth” with a capital “T”. So, we eliminate
those perspectives, effectively sanitizing philosophical discourse of any “color”.
But surely this is not the path to walk if philosophy of race and racism is our
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focus. To pledge ourselves to this sense of objectivity is to pledge ourselves to
philosophizing against the backdrop of white normativity—that “real”
philosophy is colorless, that white is “right”. This would be to ignore perspective
altogether. Thus, either subjectivity and particularity mean nothing, or there is
nothing common to speak about. This is precisely the tightrope I seek to traverse.
So, what if instead of maintaining either of subjectivity/particularity or
the traditional sense of “objectivity”, we massaged these notions to find a middle
path? My proposal is to think of “objectivity” as a general common ground,
something to which we could all in principle agree, where “general” is construed
pluralistically, and the common ground achieved is an integrative plurality of
perspectives. Note that this does not mean a so-called “view from nowhere”.
Rather, it is a view to which anyone with different perspectives could in
principle agree. The point is this: I (the author) do not completely know the
perspectives of others; thus, I have to listen to others. But I cannot listen if I
presume there is nothing we can agree on. Presuming so would be to trivialize
other points of view. My point is that all perspectives are all equally different,
and the only way to respect that difference is to assume we have common
ground for agreement. We listen.
The “common ground” to which I refer, and the work my non-standard
use of “objectivity” does for this project (in the context of race and racism), is
constitute a view from which we add up the perspectives and particularities, and
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we all see the same thing.10 Now, this does not mean that we are disembodied, or
that we “leave” our perspectives, or that we think ahistorically. All it means is
that we can all see things we can agree on, in principle, intersubjectively.11 It is an
objectivity that necessitates plurality and difference. It does not look at racism to
find sameness, but rather, to find difference. It seeks out multiple accounts of what
racism is, and how it can be modeled, because it is in those accounts that we
strengthen the objective view as opposed to discounting difference so that it fits
our preconceived notions of racism. Thus, nothing in my notion of objectivity
should be taken to imply anything like a white normative theoretical standpoint,
that objectivity means whiteness à la Mills (2012).12
Thus, instead of fighting against the blockades of ignorance and subjective
perspective, I will attempt to put together a coherent picture of racism, without
decontextualizing it and while retaining subjective perspectives. The positive
consequence of doing so is our ability to speak generally about racism without
denigrating particularity. It also has the benefit of our being able to think clearly
about how the phenomena described by independent, satellite theories of racism
may be ameliorated. If we are clear on what we are talking about, and clear on
what we are picking out, then we can more clearly strategize how to make things
better.

I am not suggesting here that we all need to have the same perspective to agree on something.
The alternative is epistemic relativism—that none of us could possibly agree on anything.
12 Neither should it be taken to imply that nonwhite philosophers cannot operate with my notion,
the very suggestion of which would itself be racist.
10
11
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So, perhaps there is yet a role for the white philosopher, and the
possibility of speaking objectively about racism. What the white philosopher can
do is an analysis of analyses of racism, the argument of chapter 2, and describe
the experience of racism from the standpoint of the participant, the argument of
chapter 3. The former is a second-order analysis which seeks no answer to the
“What is racism?” question and ignores no first-person perspectives.13 The latter
is a first-order description of what it is like to watch racism unfold (and often
participate in the unfolding) from the perspective of a white person. These are
the ways I answer whether the white philosopher can speak objectively about
racism.14
Why the White Perspective Matters
That whites often lack the experience of racial oppression is one thing, but
there is also a worry that they may do real damage if they go ahead theorizing
from their perspective anyway. The worry is that white philosophers run the risk
of “whitely” homogenizing the conversation. Whites who critique whiteness
may “participate in the object of [their] critique” without realizing it by centering
the conversation on whiteness from the white perspective (Ahmed 2007, 150, 158).
If to theorize is to uncover the assumptions that often go into our thoughts, then

As the reader will find in chapter 2, I do not mean to suggest that this is all that the white
philosopher can do, or indeed, the only approach available to white philosophers.
14 Now, lest I equivocate two senses of “objective” here, permit me to dispel any tension. Whereas
in chapter 2, “objectivity” is achieved by taking a second-order look at the first-order landscape
(i.e., theories of racism), in chapter 3, “objectivity”(though I do not rely explicitly on the term in
that chapter) is understood from within the domain of white experience. So, the former is a
domain anyone in principle can agree to because it attempts to assume no perspective in
particular, and the latter is a domain where the description is true within the domain’s universe of
discourse (i.e., the white subjective perspective).
13
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it is white people uncovering whiteness—layers of the onion peeled back all the
way through.
The implication is that critical approaches to race and racism may be
whitewashed—erasing or ignoring the perspectives of the oppressed. This worry
is further expressed by notions like “white solipsism” (Rich 1979, 299) and
“ontological expansiveness” (Sullivan 2006, 10), an “impartial” “whiteliness”
(Frye 1992, Ch. 14), the “whitely” eye (Taylor 2016), and “loving, knowing
ignorance” (Ortega 2006), all of which share a common concern: whites tend to
think about the world from a privileged lens, rendering persons of color
invisible. Thus, whites might engage in “white-splaining” to borrow a phrase
from MacMullan (2015, 648), unwittingly stamping out or ignoring the insights
of philosophers of color in the course of doing their work.
So, where does this leave white philosophers of race and racism? Should
we circumvent the white perspective altogether to avoid the issues cited above? I
worry that doing so would amount to leaving on the table how the white mind
works and whether white racism might be mitigated. The white perspective
should be embraced, we (white philosophers) need to think through the white
perspective.
Whereas, thus far, a case has been developed for a level of generality for
the analysis of race and racism, here the case pivots to the level of particularity.
What does it feel like to participate in whiteness from a first-person perspective,
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that is, from a position of power and privilege?15 Such an approach matters
because if we know how white people think, then perhaps we can take that into
account for the purpose of making things better—the ameliorative “thrust” of the
approach. If we care at all about lessening racism, we need to reach whites who
are not entirely closed off to acknowledging racism and their privileged position.
That means setting forth a realistic white psychology that is not reductive or
simplistic (e.g., that they should feel guilty, feel shame, or adopt a constant state
of vigilance against possible racism).
Bluntly put, if ameliorating oppressive relations is a practical goal, don’t
concentrate on the oppressed and understand how their minds work, concentrate
on the oppressors and how their minds work. The reason is simple: whites have
privilege. And what is privilege but a kind of power? Understanding how that
power operates in relations of oppression requires understanding how that
power operates in white psychology so as to mitigate its possible harms. Just as a
defensive coordinator in the NFL must study and know the opponents’ offensive
schemes and mindset, the white philosopher concerned with race and racism
needs to study and know her own mind. The other teams may continue scoring
points throughout a season and in seasons to come (racism is “permanent”), but
good game plans mitigate how frequently points are scored (racism is
ameliorable).

To be clear, this “pivot” is not precluded by what has so far been said—the particular and the
subjective are not ruled out by objectivity or generality, but rather retained.
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Integration and Dis-integration
So far, I have supposed that racism is ameliorable. Now, the strategies for
ameliorating racism are kaleidoscopic. And rightly so. Racism is not just a matter
of individuals behaving badly, but a broad matter of social structures continually
churning out oppressive conditions. The nature of what is to be ameliorated
oscillates from the individual, the inter-personal, and the structural. It is as if we
are playing whack-a-mole, at one moment setting our sites on the individual, the
next on the inter-personal, and then again on the structural, only to miss out on
one or the others. That is, where we gain traction on strategizing how to
ameliorate racism from the perspective of the individual, doing so may come at
the expense of ameliorating racism at a structural or inter-personal level, and
vice versa. So, the tension is this: how do we capture one without excluding the
other? Why should the strategies be dis-integrated instead of integrated?16
Perhaps the tension arises from a question of which kind of amelioration
strategy is more important, more valuable, more urgent, or more useful. While
this is worth exploring in its own right, I will not touch it here. The point is that
the literature often wavers in locating the site for making conditions better.
Amelioration, therefore, becomes murky business. But the power of the
generalist approach adumbrated above is precisely that getting clear on how to
talk about racism enables getting clear on its mitigation. What this involves is an

I write “dis-integrated” with a hyphen instead of without, because I do not mean to imply that
there is already an existing whole that has been broken up (as in disintegrated, sans hyphen). By
“integrated” I just mean that complex parts can be put together into a unified whole.

16

18
attempt to bridge the divide between the individual and the structural, a theme
that plays out over the course of chapters 2 and 3. Capturing both requires
theoretically re-framing how to think about amelioration programs as they
spring forth from certain descriptive commitments about the nature of what is to
be solved—is it the hearts and minds of individuals, a community’s shared
attitude, the institutions comprising society?
Though I draw this tension between integration and dis-integration from
the literature on racism, it has relevance and broad impact in other areas of
philosophy. Just as amelioration strategies suffer from blurred lines, the
literature on responsibility shares a similar problem. Even a cursory look at the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on “Moral Responsibility” (Talbert
2019) and “Collective Responsibility” (Smiley 2017) reveals a clutter of
metaphysical disputes. What makes an individual responsible? What makes it
such that individuals constitutive of a group share responsibility? What makes a
collective, independent of individuals, responsible?
Metaphysical morass ensues in answering these questions, and we end up
with a murkiness similar to amelioration. Where the individual is responsible for
actions she can reasonably author, she may not be responsible for her complicity
in structural harms. Where individuals share responsibility for some harm, some
may be unfairly implicated. And where a collective is responsible, some
individuals may feel no personal responsibility at all. The point of raising all of
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this is to suggest that we may want to re-frame how we think of the idea of
responsibility to accommodate all of these divided lines.
Here is the point at which the philosophical study of racism itself becomes
a kind of methodology, an approach for usefully thinking through other
problems outside its immediate purview. If we gather up the insights from the
literature on racism, we arrive at a positive launchpad for generating new ideas
and resolving intractable problems beyond the scope of racism. This is the project
of chapter 4 where I consider how racism is a springboard for re-framing the idea
of responsibility. I continue the methodological theme of collapsing divisions,
this time between responsibility models divided up into individual versus social
camps.
Thus, beyond the more general approach this dissertation takes—
philosophy as amelioration—another approach is borne out by the dissertation’s
arc. Gathering up the themes and lessons of this dissertation reveals that the
problems, phenomena, and analyses of racism together constitute a methodology
in their own right—racism as methodology.17 If we expand the constellation of
issues in the area of racism beyond the immediate, circumscribed purview of the
racism literature itself, then we can ask: “How does racism apply to other

Of course, “racism as methodology” does not mean that philosophy should be done with any
racist intent or motivation—that we should approach philosophy with a racist worldview. I am
suggesting that racism can inform the ways we approach philosophical problems, and that it can
constitute an approach for thinking about how those problems are resolvable (or not) and for
generating new ideas with regard to existing views. So, racism should count as a philosophical
methodology just as analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, feminism, and so on, are
all philosophical methodologies.
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philosophical problems, and how does it constitute an approach towards
resolving those problems, altering the ideas we work with in a general sense, and
generating novel ideas?”
Thus, it is not just that the problem of responsibility is analogous to or
parallels the problem of racism. I offer responsibility as an analogous example
not only because it too suffers from similar narrow vs. wide, particular vs. global,
dynamics, but also because the question of racism applies to responsibility in an
important way—namely, with regard to the matter of privilege/power.18 Thus,
racism as methodology—as an approach—just means that instead of using a
moral lens to analyze racism, we reverse the order of analysis and use racism to
analyze a moral idea—namely, that of responsibility. We frequently bring to bear
moral concepts on racism in order to understand what it is. But why use what
are mostly white, Euro-centric ideas of morality for our analyses? Instead, my
suggestion is to flip the script, as it were, and engage those ideas of morality,
generally, with what racism teaches us about the real world; hence, again, the
emphasis on the ameliorative function of philosophy. This reversal, as it plays
out in chapter 4, is meta-ethical in nature, asking how racism bears on our moral
idea of responsibility, and what new things it might teach us. My point is just

But couldn’t we, for instance, just switch out “race” for “gender” and come to the same
conclusion about power and responsibility? We could, of course, but that is not the point I am
making here. The idea is that racism is an approach to responsibility just as, for example, one can
approach the notion of time phenomenologically. But that does not ipso facto mean that time is
phenomenological, just as responsibility is not necessarily racist, racially unjust, or racialized. I
therefore do not mean anything terribly sophisticated by racism as methodology—e.g., it does not
mean rearticulating responsibility through the lens of critical race theory or critical philosophy of
race.
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this: why limit the impact of race-thinking within the realm of race and racism
when it has much broader implications? If racism can teach us something about
responsibility independently of race and racism, then that is all that is needed to
constitute it as a philosophical approach.
So, instead of homing in on individual, shared, or collective agency—a
dis-integrative approach—we ought to think of responsibility in terms of power.
This provides not only a realistic lens by which persons and groups are held to
account, but also reveals a plausible way to bypass the individual and the social
where responsibility is concerned. Investigating the positionality of persons
within groups along a continuum of power enables our tethering responsibility
to the ground. I argue in chapter 4 that we get desirable consequences from
doing so, leaving aside metaphysical complications and achieving a more
nuanced view where we can more clearly identify who is more and who is less
responsible for causing harmful events.19
3. Method
How does the foregoing inform the activity of philosophy? I think the
problems drawn out so far are a poignant lesson for how to do philosophy. So
instead of speaking explicitly in terms of what methodology is up to the task of
resolving the tensions above specific to race and racism, I wish here to say

Harmful events would of course include racism, but only because my re-framing of
responsibility is meant to generally capture any harmful event. Thus, the account I offer is not
specific to responsibility for racism sans phrase. It is, rather, a general view of responsibility
inspired by the problems and ideas of the philosophy of race and racism, namely a construal of
privilege as a kind of power.

19
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something much more general about how we should do philosophy. So, what I
have to say is about method in general, full stop. Obviously, given that I am
talking about approaching the activity of philosophy as such, it will apply to the
problems of race and racism which fall under its umbrella.
So, what is my approach? What is the general position from which I think
solutions to philosophical problems can be launched? I aim to develop below an
approach in the spirit of Deweyan pragmatism, specifically in the spirit of
reconstruction.20 As a philosophical aim, reconstruction reassesses the
approaches taken by other philosophical methodologies and attempts to offer a
salve. It re-tools notions—for our purposes, objectivity and generality—so that
they may be put to better use. But this is not done by sweeping away the whole
edifice of philosophy. Nor does it mean entirely doing away with the insights of
existing theories. Any reconstruction depends on what came before. The
pragmatism I am after does not resist the incorporation of multiple philosophical
methodologies to achieve practical results, where what is practical is what is best
suited to the inquiry and problems at hand. Thus, while I will lean on John
Dewey below, my intention is to make this approach my own, hence in the spirit
of and not by the letter.
Philosophy as Amelioration
The point here is to emphasize the ameliorative activity of philosophy in
the spirit of pragmatism—something I alluded to above—that things can be
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The chief influence here is Dewey (2004).
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made better both in terms of philosophical theorizing and in terms of infusing
hope into the real-world problems we face. I write “hope” not because I think
there are any grounds for optimism but instead because I think there are only
grounds for mitigation. But this does not entail that I am a pessimist. That
philosophical theory and the concrete conditions of our lives can be made better
does not mean that anything will be definitely solved, nor does it mean that
anything will never be solved. Instead, the point is that amelioration is an
ongoing activity; we do the best we can in addressing problems in philosophy
and the world with what we already have to work with.21 Thus, the point of
philosophy as amelioration is not knowing for the sake of knowing, achieving
wisdom for the sake of wisdom, but knowing for the sake of making things better
both in terms of theory and praxis. The idea here is that philosophy and the
philosopher are social functionaries of humanity.
As we saw before, white philosophers must carefully climb uphill if we
are to play a role in the philosophy of race and racism. One’s perspective can
delimit what one can know, subjectively appreciate, and offer in a field so
centrally about experience. It would seem that any attempt at speaking
objectively is moot from the get-go. But my thinking is that we can maintain both
objectivity and subjective perspectives—so long as a little methodological agility
is allowed in the mix.
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See Dewey (2004, 102-103) and Koopman (2006).
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I have hinted already at the sense of “objectivity” that operates in this
project, but so far only from within the context of race and racism. So, permit me
to say more for the purpose of explicitly clarifying my non-standard usage of the
term. What is needed is a notion of objectivity which does not calcify the (white
normative-theoretical) status quo and does not pretend to be an Archimedean
point. A “standard” sense of objectivity might mean some like a God’s-eye-view
(or a view from nowhere) which is detached and decontextualized, where
particular differences are ignored in the service of pure, unadulterated
abstraction. The epistemic “advantage” here is that of a non-subjective
perspective, that what we can know “holds” regardless of any one person’s
idiosyncratic viewpoint.
But the sense of “objectivity” I maintain here and throughout this project
turns the elements of the “standard” sense on their heads. To approach
philosophy with an eye toward objectivity must not involve ruling out disparate
perspectives. The point is that a plurality of perspectives is precisely what is needed
for any inquiry to be objective. Information is gathered at the ground-level. Once
the data is collected, the trick is to organize and order it so that we can speak in a
way that anyone in principle could agree to. The reason agreement can be
reached is that an agile notion of objectivity preserves difference. We can preserve
differences not by fetishizing them, but by drawing out what seems to be
common amongst them. After all, as Dewey (1922) notes: “…in certain
fundamental respects the same predicaments of life recur from time to time with
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only such changes as are due to change of social context…” (382-383). The point
is to think through that recurrency, putting together the differences in a coherent,
organized fashion so as to generate new ideas.
So, I take “objectivity” here to mean general, that various ideas and
perspectives can be put together coherently, constituting a common ground from
which anyone can analytically proceed and to which anyone in principle could
agree. This does not mean objectivity is a Gods-eye-view, or that it is detached
and decontextualized, or that it seeks to dismiss particular experiential
differences. Rather, the sense I am using is connected to experience, a “bringing
together” of a plurality of perspectives. It is therefore attached, contextualized, a
view from anywhere, and appreciates particular differences. The epistemic
advantage here is precisely that of collecting subjective perspectives, different
theoretical points of view and the phenomena they capture, and that what we
can know holds because of these particular viewpoints.
The agility of this approach to objectivity allows a negotiation of plurality
and generality. What are we “putting together” if not a great number of differing
perspectives, whether they be the perspectives of individuals or phenomena
expressed by different theories? And what are the “recuring predicaments”
Dewey references but kinds of “sequential bonds”, identifiable threads of
commonality that buy us abstraction and a general perspective on matters
(Dewey 1958, 122-123)? We saw in the foregoing that there is a real tension
between the particularism of the literature on race and racism and my stated
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motivation to abstract away from the particulars so as to speak more generally.
But if particularism is right, then must we do away with generality and
abstraction altogether in philosophy? How is this to be negotiated?
In the same way that we need to collect differences to speak objectively,
here again we need the particulars in order to think generally. The project of
putting things together is only possible if space is made for alternative points of
view, that is, if those alternative points of view are retained. So,
pluralism/particularism do not preclude a general description, nor vice versa.
(An endorsement of the general position p does not here mean not-q, not-r, nots…, but instead means not-not-q, not-not-r, not-not-s….) The proposed move is to
incorporate into this approach both generality and plurality, where generality is a
tool for thinking clearly only after the particulars are appreciated and gathered
up.22 This does not mean doing away with the particulars, ignoring what we find
in our context. We must start somewhere. But that does not entail generality is
meaningless.
Nay, generality is a tool. It helps us grasp the particularities of our context
(Dewey 2004, 86). The pluralism of my approach here is meant to recognize and
respect difference without succumbing wholly to the side of the “many” of the
classic “One and the many” problem. Instead, generality is functional, it brings
“one” out of the many by abstraction (86-87). Abstraction, thus, is not a four-letter
word. On the contrary, “[a]bstraction is liberation” (86), but not because it allows

I draw inspiration here from Dewey’s (2002) claim that “[t]o call a generalization a tool is not to
say it is useless; the contrary is patently the case” (244).
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access to some timeless, fixed truth. It is liberatory because it serves a functional
purpose—it helps us to deal more effectively with concrete particulars.
So, the approach is agile, it doesn’t preclude context, nor does it begin
from a universalist position. It begins with particularity and builds toward
something general, something common without pretending that the generality
arrived at is set in stone forevermore. It helps us to find the best available
approach for resolving the problems in front of us. We use the tools at our
disposal where they help, so long as it is for something practical.
But “practical” here does not always and only mean “practically good for
our social problems”. (I’ll say more about that briefly.) “Practical” for the
pragmatist also, and no less importantly, means having consequences that are
useful for inquiry (Dewey 1954, 330-331; Schwartz 2015, 36). Some theoretical
tool is practical when it plays a problem-solving role both in thought and in the
service of everyday life. The pragmatist need not be allergic to theory so long as
it is practical in the sense described. Theory organizes and orders, it improves
what we already know.
As noted above, we may rightly want to be wary of approaching problems
with any specific metaphysical commitments in tow—the blurred and divided
lines of amelioration and responsibility. The slipperiness of individuals, groups,
and social structures present a point at which inquiry finds a limit. We get tied
up trying to determine which of these should take pride of place. But instead of
sitting with these tangles, restricting ourselves to either/or binary thinking, we
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should put the metaphysics on hold and ask, “What tool should I use to move
the inquiry forward?” Pick the tools that work.23 This sense of “practical”, then,
sets us on a productive, problem-solving path, leaving unproductive binaries
behind and opening new ways to diagnose the issues.
Once we get our theoretical “ducks in a row”—i.e., once we have a general
idea of what we are talking about—we can then speak to the practical ways the
everyday affairs of the world can be improved. The philosophy-as-amelioration
approach always involves a theory-practice cadence, and once we have cleared
away the debris populating our thinking, our praxis will be well-informed.24
That’s the point of philosophy—to be a public servant, a functionary, of
humanity.
4. Previews
Chapter 2—Racism, Affiliation, Amelioration: Why Non-Reductive Unification Matters
Chapter 2 faces the above tensions head-on, setting the stage for the rest of
the dissertation. It argues that there is a role for the white philosopher, that she
can be objective, and that metaphysically tangled amelioration strategies are
resolvable. The central point it argues towards is that we ought to get
descriptively clear about racism in order to make things better, because the way

Of course, there are dangers in selecting any effective tool because doing so might commit us to
one pathway towards a solution as opposed to others. That is, the tools we use can in many ways
determine the outcome and proposed solution. But I show in chapter 2 that while this is an issue,
it is resolvable.
24 I use “praxis” here instead of “practice” to uphold the idea that what is practical is what has
consequences for theory (i.e., for inquiry). I draw no strict boundary between theory and practice.
Rather, the boundary is more appropriately drawn between theoria and praxis (in Aristotelian
language), between contemplation and action/doing.
23
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we describe can either limit or unshackle the way we prescribe. It gets there by
making a case for how the diversity of views of racism in the literature can be
unified without reducing them all to a single definition, that we can put things
together while retaining difference.
It does so by investigating that upon which types of racism, and the
phenomena they describe, conceptually depend; that is, what makes racism
formally possible. It shows that this can be done via what I call the affiliation
diagnostic system, a method of identifying our chosen and unchosen connections
to groups. The diagnostic, it is argued, shows how any type of racism is possible.
The importance of this method lies in its allowing anyone to think through
racism from a position where unique first-person perspectives, which not all
persons can possibly know, are not rejected. Ultimately, then, part of the value of
“putting together” types of racism is theoretical clarity which in turn clarifies
praxis. A better picture of the whole gets us a better picture of how to organize
our strategies for ameliorating racism.
Chapter 3—Overlooking: It Could Happen to You
Chapter 3 carries forth the “putting-it-together” theme of chapter 2,
zooming in on more specific positions in the literature on unwitting racism. It
shows that there is a bridge between two prevailing positions: active ignorance
and implicit bias. That “bridge” is a phenomenon I call overlooking, which
describes subjects who both care and know better and still undertake racist acts.
This is all done through the perspective of the privileged white participant who,
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although morally and epistemically competent, sees her racism nevertheless
unfold in front of her. It argues that overlooking is irreducible to either active
ignorance or implicit bias, the two models best equipped to capture the
phenomenon. Though overlooking is not entirely active ignorance, it has a
structural component to it, and though not entirely implicit bias, it is an
individual phenomenon. While overlooking is irreducible to these models, I
show that there are important continuities which reveal a new frontier for
approaching racism, how social structures play out in individual psychology.
Beyond new directions for approaching racism, overlooking reveals
undesirable moral and practical implications of implicit bias and active
ignorance. I argue that these views enable moral evasion from personal
responsibility and show that such evasion does not hold for overlookers. I end by
highlighting some unrealistic practical implications of active ignorance and
implicit bias, arguing that these views imply dangerous thinking that one is
“done” with racism. I claim that overlooking shows no white person can stake a
claim to such thinking.
Chapter 4—A Continuum View of Responsibility
Chapter 4 draws out, very generally, the primary themes of chapter 3,
showing that racism can function as a methodology for approaching other
questions in philosophy, a positive launchpad from which new ideas and
solutions can be generated. In chapter 3 we “looked through”, from a position of
privilege, the perspective of the racist participant. We also saw in chapters 2 and

31
3 that racism is not so neatly reducible to individuals, groups, or social
structures, and that there are good reasons for avoiding doing so. These two
themes—privilege and irreducibility—motivate the arguments of chapter 4. Here
we ask two questions: “What is privilege but a kind of power?” and “What use is
there in thinking about responsibility through metaphysical lenses?”
The chapter argues that responsibility does not just have to do with
individuals, groups, and structures and the ways they all interact. Instead, it has
to do with how power operates as a smoke-clearing tool cutting through that
interactive mess. Just as racism has been re-framed in the previous chapters as
irreducible to either the individual or the social, we might do the same here visà-vis responsibility. Given that prevailing theories of responsibility generally
focus on one or the other, responsibility too should be re-framed. Instead of
busying ourselves with the metaphysical underpinnings of responsibility, by
focusing on power we arrive at a much more nuanced view—that responsibility
lies on a continuum of power. In virtue of their position within a group, some are
more responsible than others.
Conclusion—Charting Out New Paths: Two Sites for Future Research
The dissertation’s conclusion drafts some ideas for future research borne
out by some of the dissertation’s major themes. There, I carry forth the themes of
chapter 4 (the responsibility-power continuum) and re-direct attention back to
privilege. I unpack the idea that responsibility itself is a privileged affair and
sketch a general position according to which responsibility is asymmetrical, that
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it is a disproportionately available privilege. The general view is supported by
the socio-economic reality that privilege is involved in the capacity to take up
responsibility at all for oneself, one’s actions, and for others. Doing good, that is,
is available only to those who have the means to do good.
I then consider, again, the role of the white philosopher in the philosophy
of race and racism and the aggressor/oppressor perspective. I ask whether there
is more to be learned about white psychology from the white perspective. What I
propose, first, is to approach white psychology from a non-moralistic starting
point, and second, to approach microaggressions from the perspective of the
white aggressor. The point is that if we don’t look through the perspective of the
aggressor, we will miss out on a realism about her psychology, and what we get
is a subtler, greater range of the phenomenon. In the style of overlooking, it is a
diagnostic for those who don’t want to engage in microaggressions from the
perspective of the aggressor.
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Chapter 2
Racism, Affiliation, Amelioration: Why Non-Reductive Unification Matters
Introduction
Racism, at every turn, resists order: it can be caused unwittingly by one’s
psychology, live and thrive in social structures, depend on different epistemic
points of view, be contingent on different histories and locations, and may be
describable theoretically or moralistically. But which point of view is the right
one? Is there a right one? If there isn’t, it seems we are left with a mess. With so
many moving targets where it comes to racist phenomena, when we want to hit
those moving targets, we end up with a fragmented multitude of theories of
racism. There just seems to be no general, basic idea of what we’re talking about.
And because of the fragmented views in the literature, each view comes up with
separate ameliorative strategies; each, that is, offers different ways to lessen
racism. But if we cannot get straight on how to get a picture of the whole, how do
we mitigate the various instantiations of racism, or indeed racism as such? We
should want at least some bare minimum commonality between them so that we
can effectively approach how it all might be made better. But, what’s the
alternative to a multiplicity of theories of racism? Perhaps we reduce racism to
some one thing, even if that misses out on the subtleties of real racist
phenomena. There is a dilemma to face up to: either accept a multitude of
fragmented theories, with no coherent concept or ameliorative strategy, or just
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reduce it all to some one thing, ignoring contextual differences and ameliorative
strategies.
This chapter asks how we might approach unifying theories of racism in
general and attempts to dissolve the dilemma by showing that there is a way to
be objective in the philosophy of race and racism, a field resistant to objectivity,
while respecting the differences of varieties of racism and without being
reductive. But can a white philosopher (i.e., this author) be objective in this field?1
What is the role of white philosophers in this conversation and what are their
limits? It is easy for whites to not know or talk about aspects of racism because
there are no bad consequences for them. Yet when I stake a claim to objectivity,
I’m saying that there is a way to think about things that anyone could in
principle agree to regardless of their perspective. But what becomes of firstperson perspectives if we endeavor towards an objective point of view? Are they
to be ignored for the sake of descriptive simplicity?
One way to objectively analyze racism is to reduce it all to a single
definition: racism is x. But if a philosopher of color understands the
consequences of some racist phenomenon as stronger or deeper than whatever is
captured by x, then on an objective approach qua reduction, we may be required

Recall from chapter 1 that the sense of “objective” is not the “traditional” sense of the word—
that is, it does not mean anything like a God’s-eye-view. As one will see in a moment, this does
not mean I am asking anyone to adopt a homogenized white perspective. That is, I am not asking
anyone to “see it like whites see it”. Rather, what I am after is a perspective open to anyone at all.
Moreover, I am not saying that because I lack the experience of racism, all that I can do is assume
an objective stance. What I have to say here and below should not be confused as conflating
objectivity with white normativity or “white” analysis.

1
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to deny that first-person perspective. But I’m not attempting to sanitize the scene.
I will try to be objective in a different way that puts the pieces of racism together
as a whole without reduction and with retention of first-person perspectives.
To fill these tall orders, I’m going to take a meta-theoretical second-order
approach: an analysis of analyses. What I mean is that I will look at—i.e.,
analyze—analyses of racism and try to make sense of it all. That is, at a second
order, I am offering a way to think about how first-order theories explain racism.2
I take up this second-order perspective to identify, objectively, what order there
is in theories of racism and the phenomena they capture. What being objective
means here has to do with approach, a way of thinking conceptually about racism
at a meta-theoretical level. I do so by invoking the tool of transcendental
analysis.3 All I will mean by this is thinking about what makes racism possible, that
upon which all the different types of racisms (and their phenomena) conceptually
depend—i.e., how it is possible that there is racism at all. I do not mean this in any
metaphysical sense, that theories of racism and their phenomena are such-andsuch. Nor do I mean to suggest that this is a program for “correctly” or

To be clear, I am not suggesting that a second-order approach is synonymous with whiteness or
that it is an unraced “ideal” to which we should aspire. Nor am I saying that all whites can do is a
second-order approach. The approach is not closed to anyone at all. The very idea that I would
mean that this meta-theoretical, second-order approach is just for white philosophers would
imply racist connotations—namely, that nonwhites cannot do meta-theory. Obviously, I mean the
exact opposite. The point is just that we need a second-order approach to get a sense of racism as
a whole for ameliorative purposes.
3 This may seem odd given my pragmatic approach explained in chapter 1. However, it is not
inconsistent to take a transcendental approach here. Taking philosophy as amelioration as inspired
by pragmatism does not preclude using other methodologies at our disposal. We use the tools
that work for the problem at hand, and I argue below that this is the best available tool for the
analysis I conduct in this chapter.
2
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definitively answering how to describe racism. So, I will not identify a novel
phenomenon, advance a new first-order theory, or explain what racism is in
some way that connects all the views together.
What I will do is approach differently how we think about theories of
racism, a new way to approach it to which anyone in principle could agree. I will
show that this can be done by what I call the affiliation diagnostic system, a method
of identifying individuals’ chosen (or unchosen) connection to some group(s)
which shows how any variety of racism is possible. The import of this diagnostic
method lies in its putting together racisms in a coherent non-fragmented, nonreductive way. It retains the varieties’ differences and respects an epistemic
perspective that I don’t have, all while not losing sight of the unique value of the
respective theories that may be lost via reduction. The reason this approach is
important is that it will enable anyone to think through the whole of racism from
a position where one need not reject authors’ unique first-person perspectives
which not all persons can possibly completely know.
But beyond non-reductive unification and its benefits, why should it
matter whether there is any order to racisms, and why should we want
objectivity at all, looking at things at a second order? These things matter because
it helps us to make racism better as a whole. Instead of the way we describe
limiting the way we prescribe, we can unburden ourselves and use any
amelioration tool at our disposal. Beginning from a sound generalist framework
allows us to get our ducks in a row in terms of real practical ways to address the
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situation so that we can effectively leap into praxis. Ultimately, then, this is a
chapter about method. It is about how to make our understanding of racisms
theoretically clearer, in general, and show that clarity of the whole helps clarify
praxis vis-à-vis strategies of amelioration.
1. Putting Together the Picture
This section argues for a dissolution to the dilemma. It shows that we
need not hang our hats on either the side of fragmentation (horn 1), by which I
mean a multiplicity of independently valid theories and phenomena, or
reduction (horn 2) by which I mean an approach which boils it all down to one
thing. I will call these horns the “many” and the “one”, respectively. I argue for
non-reductively unifying varieties of racism and the phenomena they capture by
putting them together in a coherent way. I take cues from Martha Nussbaum’s
(1988) method of identifying a ground underneath culturally different actions,
something basic on which they all depend. This launches my own transcendental
approach, a formal way of thinking at a second order (clarified in section 1.3)
which focuses on what makes racism possible at all. The reason this approach
matters is that it dissolves the dilemma, unifying racisms without focusing solely
on difference or reduction. Differences are retained. Theories are non-reductively
put together. And the approach results in a valuable tool, the affiliation diagnostic
system, which helps us to understand varieties of racism as dependent on
different ways we are connected to groups. Ultimately, this tool is valuable
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because it allows us to talk objectively about racism without denying first-person
perspectives and without oversimplifying the conversation.
1.1. Horn 1: Selections of the “Many”
Let us begin by tackling the first horn of our dilemma—accepting a
multitude of fragmented, satellite theories of racism. This sub-section is our base
camp from which our expedition towards putting together racisms begins.
Though I will draw out some consequences critical of the fragmented landscape,
I do not mean to deny the positions’ unique value.4 We should appreciate the
richness of each position’s identification and explanation of its own particular
form of racist phenomenon, because identifying the various ways racism
manifests provides inroads towards identifying what is variously morally
problematic about it. Nevertheless, what do these “satellite” racisms all have to
do with each other?5 Shouldn’t we want to know how or whether they all work
together? The question to consider in this sub-section, and one to which I
explicitly turn in section 1.3, is this: do they have anything at all in common?

Allow me to dispel a possible confusion with regard to the dilemma’s framing and what is
stated here. I do not mean to suggest that the consequences of each horn—the “one” and the
“many”—are equally negative. I present over the course of sections 1.1 and 1.2 a picture according
to which the “many” has less severely negative consequences than the “one” (of which I am more
critical). But this should not be taken to imply that the “many” does not have issues of its own.
5 To be clear, I do not presuppose, nor will I say, that racism is just one thing, nor that it must be
defined with necessary and sufficient conditions. It could be constituted by family resemblances
or by multiple models. The fact that there are many racisms is not a problem, and I have far more
sympathy for this than I do for a conceptually defined RACISM (but see note 6). Because my goal
in section 1.3 is to integrate racisms—that the theories and phenomena should be retained—I have
no reason to reject multiple views. Thus, unlike those who might want to conceptually define
racism, in which case they would have to exclude certain models of the target phenomena of
racism that would fit their intension of racism, I neither must nor will do that.
4
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Now, as I cannot possibly go over all varieties of racism in the literature, I
will focus on some views I take to be representative of fundamental themes in
the literature. I take up Garcia’s (1996, 1999) volitional account of racism (VAR),
active ignorance (AI), and implicit bias (IB). The reason I pick these views is that
they cover a wide swath where racism can be construed as ill-intentioned
motivations (VAR), the result of willful ignorance which maintains structural
racism (AI), and nonconscious action (IB). The thing to notice is that each
position points out something uniquely different about racism, something that is
linked to each position’s basic assumptions and commitments.
Let us begin with VAR where, according to Garcia (1999), racism is always
a matter of “racial dis-regard or even ill-will…, the core of the phenomenon”
(13). Though individualistically-centered, Garcia thinks that VAR covers a wide
range, from individuals to institutional practices (13). Importantly, however,
whether it be a racist action or institutional practice, racism always starts at the
“hearts” of individuals (Garcia 1996). Within its purview, VAR picks out a
genuinely racist phenomenon. We need look no further than those who harbor
explicit racial hatred towards someone or some group to see that VAR uniquely
captures such persons—they are not unintentionally or unwittingly biased. And
we would not want to do without VAR, because it helps us understand the
egregiousness of overt individual racism.
Does this capture all racist phenomena? VAR is problematized by AI, a
view which adds more subtly to a description of how racism is generated and
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maintained. While we do not need to disagree with Garcia’s VAR, there is much
more complexity to explore beyond disregard and ill-will, namely those more
covert aspects of racism. AI identifies a “structured” willful white ignorance as a
site from which racism is produced and maintained. Whether the discussion
centers on resistance to acknowledging racism or knowing anything about it
(Mills 2007; Bailey 2007; Medina 2013), or a deficient motivation to acknowledge
or know that whiteness maintains a racist status quo (Mills 1997; Sullivan 2006;
Alcoff 2007; DiAngelo 2011, 2018) what is common amongst these views is a
point about deliberate ignorance of racial injustices and inequalities, with the
additional goal of furthering white supremacy and maintaining power. Like
VAR, AI uniquely picks out something genuinely real about racism, namely how
it is sustained at both individual and structural levels. Though AI emerges from
whites’ epistemic resistance, its “value” is its broader social impact, an attempt
(conscious or not) to uphold white privilege and supremacy, to “hang on” as it
were, to the benefits whiteness affords white people. We should want to retain
the AI position as it betters our understanding of how white denial of racial
injustices buttresses and preserves racist social systems.
But there are aspects of racism which are not the result of active (or nonactive) ignorance perpetrated even by those who know better and care a great
deal about not doing racist things. Could knowledge and care stand as stalwart
barriers against racism?6 Not according to IB. Like VAR, we may focus

I write both “knowledge” and “care” because one might know a great deal about how and why
she should avoid race-based harms but not be motivated to avoid those harms—e.g.,

6
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individualistically, but instead of searching for racial disregard or ill-will, the
point here is to unpack someone’s implicit biases. Even the most wellintentioned people fall prey to automatic associations made within their
psychology, relying non-consciously on unfair racist stereotypes to guide their
behavior and actions (Kelly and Roedder 2008; Devine et al. 2012; Holroyd 2012;
Hardin and Banaji 2013; Banaji and Greenwald 2016; Amodio and Swencionis
2018). IB presents a picture where unwitting racism is sometimes right around
the corner. What IB uniquely captures is that racism can result from
psychological processing, that it can catch us by surprise. Retaining this position
is important because without it we would lose a distinctly empirical
understanding of unwitting racism, as well as an integration of social and
individualistic scope.
Now, given that I think the foregoing should be retained, I have no
reasons to reject any of these positions.7 But there are some worrying
methodological consequences if we accept that making sense of racism amounts
to offering a multitude of fragmented theories. It is the approach which should
trouble us. For instance, where we see some phenomenon p that may or may not

knowledgeable sociopaths. The point is that there needs to be some motivation to avoid racism,
even where one is knowledgeable.
7 One might wonder at this juncture whether active ignorance or implicit bias are accounts of
racism per se. I think there are at least two ways to approach this question. First, challenging that
AI and IB are not accounts of racism per se may be a politically or morally motivated move to
limit “racism” to an intentionally narrow range of phenomena that allows for evading being
labeled a “racist”. Second, and I say more about this in note 8, theorists of AI and IB, to my
knowledge, are not positing that “Racism” with a capital “R” just is active ignorance or implicit
bias—i.e., they are not defining “racism”. They can be understood as models of racism. That is, they
are meant to explain or “pick out” certain kinds of racist phenomena or phenomena with racist
connotations and implications.
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be racist, we tend to go to our preferred method of description to determine
whether p is racist. Even though these positions do not take a reductive approach
in general (i.e., reduction is not their aim), when viewing p through the lens of
their position, there is a kind of practical reduction afoot.8 What I mean is that for
the purpose of explaining p, a theorist of AI might see p as an instance of AI
whereas a theorist of VAR might see (the very same) p as an instance of VAR.
The point is that theorists attach their positions to understanding
particular cases. Take for example the “All Lives Matter” response to the Black
Lives Matter movement. This response is arguably best explained as an instance
of AI, a way of deliberately ignoring the Black Lives Matter message so as to
deny its import and own up to the role that whites play in making it such that
black lives do not matter. But if one holds sacredly to VAR, she may see “All
Lives Matter” as an instance of ill-will, hate, or disregard directed towards blacks
because they are blacks.9 The point is that if we are so attached to our preferred
model, then we run the risk of misidentifying phenomena.
Though this fragmented landscape is not a hyper-competitive one—i.e., it
is not an “I’m right, you’re wrong” environment—there is a narrowness of
approach these positions take. That is, none I think would reject the others as
flat-out wrong—e.g., being an IB theorist would not require denying AI or VAR

Though I am saying defenders of position X see p as X even if it seems p is actually captured by position
Y, this does not mean X-ists say all racisms are X—e.g., to my knowledge, no theorist of AI says
all racism is born of, or just is, AI.
9 We might well add “contempt” to this list. For Garcia (1996, 6-7; 1999, 13-18) “contempt” is
included in the notion of disregard.
8
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wholesale. But even if there is no “my way or the highway” attitude, the practical
reality is that this attitude is where we end up when we accept an overall method
of specialization without any generalist understanding. We end up there because,
unique phenomena require unique theoretical insights and explanations. This is
the stuff of a specialized approach, concentrating hard on some particular aspect
of the racist whole. It is inevitable, then, that we have a fragmented landscape; a
lot of unique phenomena means a lot of unique theories. But the result is a
methodological narrowness, a level of specialization that is required for making
sense of the complexity of racism. And so, beyond the issue of possible
misidentifications, I want to raise a further worry relating to methodological
overspecialization. Experts offer views so narrow that a generalist view falls
outside the scope of investigation. Who are these views for? It seems very likely
that they are for other academics, resisting as a matter of method what would
otherwise be helpful for the public’s understanding.
My point is that overspecialization is not making matters clearer for the
people who are (or should be) our targets—the public—and it becomes difficult
for the public at large to trust what experts say. The public can deny the nuances
of structural racism wholesale because one likely has to be an “academic” to
understand them. They can reject IB because it assumes special knowledge of
psychology. The point is that specialized discourse alienates the public because it
requires specialized academic knowledge. The role of the pragmatist (or of
philosophy as amelioration) should be to overcome specialization and invent a
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different way of approaching racism that provides a function for the public. We
should help clarify, not confuse, because racism is a problem of the public for
whom we should offer clear tools for understanding and combatting racism.
What could be more ameliorative than something the public could understand
and get on board with? If we grant that the role of the philosopher is arguably, at
least in part, to offer theoretical clarity for the sake of the public (i.e., to be a
functionary of humanity), then we should tone down the specialized discourse
and offer broader brushstrokes.
1.2. Horn 2: Reduction, or the “One”
If we want to avoid the consequences of horn 1, and paint with a big
brush, then how might we think through a more general framework that could
put these views together? One option, and the second horn of our dilemma, is to
reduce racism to some single explanatory feature. So, if we want to put it all
together, then perhaps we could reduce the different varieties of racism. The
reductive approach is appealing because it simplifies the fragmented landscape
in such a way as to avoid butting our heads against a brick wall, especially where
it comes to capturing conflicting domains (e.g., individual and structural racisms).
Though I have said that my aim is to be objective, I will argue that achieving this
aim via a reductive approach is unattractive because it obscures more than it
coheres, generates an interpretive double-bind, and likely denies non-white firstperson perspectives.
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Whether it is a “desire to dominate” (Schmid 1996), ideology (Shelby
2002), “inferiorization” or “antipathy” (Blum 2002a, 8; 2002b, 210), or
“disrespect” (Glasgow 2009), all these positions share or imply a common
approach, a sort of reduction or at least a reduction in spirit. By that I mean
where we want a satisfying notion of “racism”, we simplify the various
complexities to find a common core—where such simplification has the effect
that racism, metaphysically, is x, or conceptually, is understood as x.10 Being
reductive “at least in spirit” just means that there may be something missing that
does not fall under the racism umbrella, but that there are good reasons to think
in reductive ways about racism—e.g., for simplicity’s sake, greater explanatory
power, or a satisfying extension of the word racism. The distinction between
metaphysical (racism is x) and conceptual (racism as x) simplification matters
because not all reduction is monistic (as in “racism is this one thing, x”). Some
theories offer a conceptual strategy to make sense of racism by analogizing it
with something else (as in “racism is like x” and so we can understand racism “as
x”). The distinction is important because we should not confuse all reduction as
metaphysical simplification.

I stated in this chapter’s introduction that I will offer a way of thinking conceptually about
racism at a second order. To dispel any confusion about my claim there and my labeling here of
conceptual reduction (i.e., racism as x), allow me to clarify by drawing a further distinction
between conceptual in the first order and conceptual in the second order. I take those who offer
descriptions of racism as x, y, or z as doing first order conceptual work to capture racist
phenomena. But I am after, at a second order, that on which all the different x’s, y’s, and z’s
conceptually depend. The difference between the two will be spelled out in more detail shortly.
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What I am going to do here is explicitly address Glasgow (2009), because
he offers a unification view for racism (64). So, we will look at Glasgow’s
“disrespect analysis” of racism (DA), but not to determine whether he has the
right content of racism (that it is fundamentally disrespectful), but rather because
he has a representative reductive approach. Since Glasgow is explicitly going for a
unification of theories of racism and the phenomena they capture, I am singling
him out as representative, because I too am aiming for unification, albeit nonreductively. The aim here is to show the shortcomings of the reductive approach in
general, not just the specifics of Glasgow’s view.
Seeking to explain ordinary usage of “racism” (92), Glasgow’s DA may
provide the key to capturing all racisms. On the DA, “φ is racist if and only if φ is
disrespectful towards members of racialized group R as Rs” (81).11 Like Garcia’s
VAR, Glasgow takes his view to be powerful enough to explain the basic
character of any instance of racism whether individual or social/institutional (82,
91-92). DA, though, has an upper hand over VAR because it does not depend
solely on the hearts and minds of individuals.12 Indeed, disrespect is broad
enough to describe inter-personal and institutional aspects of racism and racist
societies (82-84). For instance:

He uses “racialized groups” instead of “races” because he wants to remain agnostic about the
question of whether race is real (81). Racialized groups for Glasgow are “groups of people who
have been identified and treated as if they were members of the same race” (81).
12 Hence my focusing on the DA as an example of the reductive approach as opposed to VAR.
The reason that VAR is categorized under the “many” instead of the “one” is that it offers a
specific kind of racism. The VAR does not aim to understand all varieties of racism as “in the
heart”; rather, it implies that all other varieties simply do not get racism right, a denial of racisms
that are not in the heart. The difference, then, is that the DA unifies by reduction, that all varieties
of racism are unified under the DA.
11
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Antimiscegenation laws failed to respect rights of intimacy and love and
the people whose rights were at stake. The political, legal, and military
institutions in the United States that collectively enabled the near
extermination of multiple indigenous American peoples disrespected
them on several fronts, not least as members of sovereign nations and as
persons with a moral standing that entails rights of life and security… (8384).
At whatever level, then, disrespecting someone or some group on account of race
could be a descriptive root to any racism whatsoever.
But while a reductive analysis offers simplicity and explanatory breadth,
there are reasons to be wary of the approach for the purpose of putting racisms
together. It creates tunnel vision where views like the DA can obscure our sight.
The approach misses out on the sophistication and subtly of other views because
some aspects of racism fall through the cracks in reduction, aspects which are not
neatly packageable by disrespect. Take, for instance, “racism as self-love” (Silva
2019) which describes whites as wanting to maintain, as a matter of selfpreservation, the privileges they have at the expense of non-whites.13 It is
difficult to see where the disrespect is in this, because whites are not racist on this
view out of disrespect, but instead, as a means for protecting their social status.14
Neither is it just a matter of unintentionally “disrespecting” non-whites, because
the “self-love” aim of whites as protecting their status is not necessary intentional

Racism as self-love is not the only instance of “racism as x” that is not neatly reducible to the
DA. Further instances might include, for example, anti-black racism as bad faith (Gordon 1995),
racism as technology (Russel 2018), and racism as “structural domination” (Omi and Winant
1994).
14 This challenge does not emerge solely from Silva’s account. This sort of reductive approach will
not help elsewhere. It is unlikely that disrespect can capture the nuance of automaticity in IB. AI
seems to be a case of willful disregard with ulterior motives of maintaining white supremacy and
power rather than disrespect. VAR includes hate which seems, prima facie, stronger than
disrespect.
13
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either. It is, whether intentional or not, that whites exhibit racist behaviors with
the aim of protecting themselves rather than the aim of harming or
“disrespecting” others.15 And so, it would be misguided to ask whether self-love
racism just amounts to disrespect.
This difficulty relates to a further worry that the DA approach will lead to
awkward interpretations of or the discounting of views like self-love racism,
attempting to put them in the disrespect “box”. Supposing we put our
disrespect-tinted glasses on, where different varieties of racism come into view,
we may end up in an interpretative double-bind. Either we awkwardly interpret
those varieties by gymnastically rationalizing them as an instance of disrespect,
or we discount those varieties as not “genuinely” racist against good reasons that
they are genuinely aspects of the racist whole. And if it really is all disrespect,
then how do we mitigate racisms that do not amount to disrespect? If the only
tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
Though I have said that we should want an objective overview of racisms,
the only way that might help us achieve this—this reductive methodology—
seems unattractive. Being objective via that method would seem to require us to
deny subjectivity, that is, the epistemic privilege that imbues many notions of
racism. And striving for something universal may require our ignoring the
nuance of particularity where racist phenomena and the theories that capture

The same could be said of institutions. That is, it is not just that they are not explicitly,
intentionally doing racist things, but rather that their motivation for doing so (which might be
self-love) is different than disrespect supposes.
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them are concerned. Should we kindly tell George Yancy (2008) that his
experience of the “elevator effect” really boils down to disrespect? The point is
that reduction as a methodology is tone-deaf, it runs the risk of ignoring the value
of perspectival knowledge that theorists of color afford. If I, a white philosopher
of race, want to offer an objective overview of racisms, then I will need to avoid
the consequences of a reductive approach.16
1.3. Dissolution: Method and the Affiliation Diagnostic System
My aim in this section is second-order clarification of what theories of
racism and the phenomena they capture have in common. To wit, I will offer a
new way of thinking, just a framework, that can avoid the methodological issues
of the “one” and the “many” and yet retain their methodological virtues. I will
unify without reducing and without denying the fruits of overspecialized
narrowness. My approach is a formal, generalist second-order meta-theory that
does not rule out first-order analyses of racism.17

One might worry, à la Blum (2002a, 1-32), about watering down a theory of racism to the point
where it is ineffective. So, let me be clear: any definition of racism I entertain is heuristic—i.e., for
clarity’s sake for the present inquiry. They work as operating definitions for the purpose of
developing a general second-order view of the first-order landscape. To reiterate, I am not
offering a definition of racism, but an overview. An overview supervenes on what is already there,
and it is not reductive. There is a trade-off between accuracy and explanatory power. A reductive
approach sacrifices the former for the latter. So, the worry ought to be about missing certain
phenomena in sacrificing detail and accuracy for explanatory power. My thinking is that there is
nothing wrong in being accurate to the many different ways racism manifests, and that there are
no good reasons to prefer reduction over accuracy. So, what I am after below is a formal “core” of
racism which allows us to understand why it manifests in various different ways.
17 Such generality can in fact help in coming to appreciate a novel first-order articulation of racism
even if such an articulation proves to be an exception to the “rule”. Indeed, whether the
generality fails may also be a worthwhile investigation. That is, if a new first-order articulation
does not fit with the meta-theory I offer, that is not a death knell to the meta-theory, because then
we have the opportunity to look at the differences which change the whole (and not the other
way around).
16
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By first-order analysis, I mean an explanation of some phenomenon p as
this-or-that, or an explanation that p is this-or-that, providing the content of p for
the purpose of “picking out” p from amongst the crowd.18 And by my own
second-order analysis, I mean analysis of first-order analyses. This involves
thinking about how first-order analyses explain racism—their nature, their goals,
and their methodologies. So, my approach is meta-theoretical as opposed to
theoretical; that is, I am not offering a first-order theory explaining some racist
phenomenon, but instead, a second-order (meta-)theory of theories that purport
to explain racist phenomena.
Now, nearly all varieties of racism seem to involve some notion of race,
harm, and the way people are grouped and interact. So, there ought to be
something common running through the varieties based on these first-order
contents, something to which we could reduce them all. But we saw the
problems with reduction. So, my suggestion is to think about the varieties of
racism formally. The formality of my approach takes a cue from Nussbaum’s
(1988) method, which is to find the lowest common denominator of human
action, that on which all varieties of action depend.19 Her process is to compare
varieties of actions—seeing whether there is a common overlap amongst them—

For instance, an explanation of racism (p) as “self-love” or that it (p) is disrespect.
Nussbaum’s question is the particularity versus universality of ethics. While this has some
import for racism, I consider solely her method and not that issue of content. As Nussbaum’s
method is to allow for culturally particular flexibilities while finding a universal core of
experience, I distance myself from that specific question, whether racism is universal at all or
merely historically and culturally relative. The point here is about how varieties of racism
(theories and phenomena) all depend on a basic foundation like Nussbaum’s “spheres of
experience”.
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for the purpose of finding what they have in common. It is by comparison that
we find a lowest common denominator, much like if we want to know whether
there is some form to triangles. We never “see” a perfect, pure TRIANGLE, but by
comparison of triangles, we come to know that there is some form underlying
them all. The result is some form that makes any action possible at all, a “sphere”
of experience in which we must act. The point is that identifying commonality
reveals what could formally account for that commonality, that we can allow
differences without losing sight of what is basic to them all. Though we never
“see” this lowest common denominator in any one action in any one culture, the
overlap between the local variations is found by comparison.20 So, by form I just
mean that on which all first-order content depends. I understand dependency in
transcendental terms where varieties of phenomena p, q, r… and the first-order
theories which capture them are all made possible by some basic formal ground.
A formal transcendental analysis of theories of racism and the phenomena they
capture will help us think about how it is possible that there is racism at all.
How, then, will this resolve the problems with fragmentation and
reduction? I argue that there is a unifying form on which all first-order content
depends, thus not ruling out any first-order content, all while putting the pieces
together—unification without reduction. I will do something like Nussbaum but

Now, we could stop at comparison vis-à-vis racisms. But if we stop there, then we are reducing,
because identifying a common overlap implies a first-order “core” or extension of “racism”. That
is not my aim, and indeed, I’m going beyond that at a second-order to show how to unify racisms
without first-order reduction or extension, all while not presuming to know better than those
with epistemic privilege.
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with racism as my target, offering a formal ground on which racisms all depend.
Just as there is, objectively, some way we must act (a sphere), there is, objectively,
something basic on which racisms (theories and phenomena) depend, affiliation, a
common and necessary feature of human experience. All I will do is chart a
middle path, a meta-theoretical framework that puts the first-order pieces of
racism together in an objective, coherent way so that no one is just wrong—
retaining epistemic privilege—but at the same time not reducing. My framework
will not say what racism is, at a first-order, but offer a basis for uniting racisms at
a second-order. Thus, none of this will help us to “see” the essence of racism, and
it is likely that there is no “pure” reductive essence of racism—rather, the basic
foundation is generated by comparing all the different first-order theories of
racism, just as Nussbaum generates a basic foundation (the spheres) by
comparing different kinds of action.
1.3.1. The Affiliation Diagnostic System
Given that racism basically has to do with individuals and groups, maybe
there is something to just looking at the relationship of an individual to a group.
And when we just look at this more basic frame, we see that if it were not for the
relationship of an individual to a group, racism would not be possible.21 This
offers a more basic way to think about racisms that can unify all the varieties. So,
we are headed in a new direction: showing that the varieties of racism can be
unified by explaining what makes them all possible, namely subject-group

While it is an interesting question whether someone could be racist to herself, I am agnostic
about this and thus leave the question aside.

21

53
connection, affiliation. We will see that the different ways individuals affiliate
map onto the different varieties of racism. Now, it is possible to misunderstand
me as making a series of metaphysical points below, but recall that I am talking
about formal transcendental conditions of possibility of racism. This is just a
meta-theoretical diagnostic system that gives us purchase on how all the
positions in the literature on racism fit together as whole.
Before seeing what the affiliation diagnostic system does, some technical
terms on which I rely need straightening out. First, an affiliation is that which
makes possible a connection between a subject and a group, and/or an
attachment someone has to the set of beliefs constitutive of that group. Though
the content of one’s affiliations to different groups likely differs, that one has
affiliations is true of any subject; that is, we all belong to groups regardless of the
specifics.22 So, it is at least a priori plausible that the “attachment” we have to
groups is formally basic in the sense that it is a part of the experience of any one
of us, whether recognized or not.23 Now, affiliation as such can be spelled out in

Cases like feral children notwithstanding, I am assuming that all subjects are connected to
groups, and that there must be groups to which subjects can affiliate. I am assuming, also, that
the sorts of things that in part make us human—e.g., a sense of self, language, sets of values,
beliefs, aims, and so on—likely manifest from group membership. While feral children are
obviously human, they miss out on some of the basics of human experience. I am just offering a
technical definition that is likely safe to assume.
23 But what makes affiliation specifically a condition of possibility of racism when it is just as
plausibly a condition of possibility of friendship or religion, neither of which have much (if
anything) to do with racism? There is nothing unique (in terms of first-order content) about
affiliation that makes it a condition of possibility of racism beyond its being presupposed in our
thinking about race relations. While it is likely true that certain affiliations come with
disproportionate access to material recourses and socio-political capital along racial lines, I am
not making that claim. Doing so would amount to first-order conceptual reduction: that racism
should be understood as affiliation.
22
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at least two distinct ways: groups of which we do not and do choose to be
members. I call the former involuntary and the latter voluntary affiliations.
By involuntary affiliation, I mean affiliations which are accidents of birth, a
passive connection a subject has to some unchosen group. The “accidental”
nature of involuntary affiliation can be exemplified in any number of ways, say,
by one’s connection to family, sex, disability, race, to those who are 5 feet 5
inches tall, and so on. Though these affiliations are unchosen, the connection a
subject has to these groups likely influences her psychology, how she thinks of
herself and others given the milieu of sociocultural features associated with those
groups into which she was born. Whether wanted or not, involuntary affiliations
are a probable source of our unnoticed and unreflective beliefs and values, of
which we might adopt some or all. Yet, if all affiliations were involuntary, then
some groups would not exist—bowling teams, friend groups, political parties,
and so on.
Affiliations that are not involuntary are voluntary affiliations, by which I
mean a subject’s chosen group attachments. Common to any voluntary affiliation
is activity. The activity of voluntarily affiliating with some group allows us to “go
beyond” our involuntary affiliations. For example, when going beyond what is
associated with an involuntary affiliation to whiteness (and its possible racism
and benefits incurred by an accident of birth), that might mean being affiliated
with something like “wokeness” (acknowledging those benefits and possible
racism to lessen them). I take “wokeness” to be a shared set of beliefs constitutive
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of the woke group, and so in a case like this, the subject’s affiliation to “wokeness”
is ipso facto an affiliation to the woke group. But this is possible only if subjects
actively develop affiliations outside their in-groups as a matter of conscious choice
and does not mean simply “being around” subjects of an out-group. Those who
do so are likely sufficiently motivated because they care about others and/or
about who they want to be (e.g., whites who want to be antiracists).
If we grant that affiliation is basic to human experience, then against that
backdrop we can see that theories of racism and the phenomena they capture
have affiliation as a lowest common denominator. No variety of racism is
possible without it. We can see how fragmented theories of racism are not as
disparate as they may at first blush seem, and we do not need to be reductive to
clean up the picture. Instead, we can clean things up by diagnosing the sorts of
affiliation that make racisms possible, thus showing that we can unify the whole
in a coherent way. As in section 1.1, I cannot possibly be exhaustive,
encyclopedically reviewing all the varieties of racism in the literature. But if my
view holds water, then any first-order position on racism is mappable by
affiliation.
The Consistent Involuntary & Voluntary Case
Let us begin with a case where a subject’s involuntary and voluntary
affiliations are the same. Where there is no difference between these affiliations,
we can clearly think through what makes a notion of racism such as Garcia’s
VAR possible. We can understand VAR as mapping onto subjects who both
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absorb the forces of privilege and power given an involuntary affiliation to
whiteness, and who do not disaffirm at a higher-order the beliefs and values that
result from those forces.24 The reason we talked about involuntary affiliation was
to capture the way sociocultural influences of certain group memberships have
on members’ psychology. But in the case of VAR, does it matter that structural
privileges and power are the cause of subjects’ racism? Regardless of the source,
it is clear that there just is no difference between these racists’ nonconscious and
conscious beliefs, intentional or unintentional forms of racisms, because they
outright endorse racism.
The point is that their voluntary and involuntary affiliations are
consistent. There is no conflict here and no difference. In a word, there just are
people who are actively, pridefully racist. They do not go beyond the influences
of their involuntary affiliations, instead embracing them. By “go beyond”, I just
mean that we can develop different beliefs and values which depart from the
influences of our involuntary affiliations. So, for example, when going beyond
what is associated with an involuntary affiliation to whiteness, that might mean
being affiliated with groups which aim for an awareness of issues centering on
racial justice. But because there is no motivation to go beyond whiteness, there
just is no difference between their involuntary and voluntary affiliations, making
their volitional racism possible. But matters are not always so simple as this, as
we cannot always be sure of what one’s voluntary affiliations amount to.

Though Garcia would likely disagree with this characterization (i.e., that structural forces are
the cause the subject’s racism), I will mention in a moment why the source does not matter.
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The Involuntary Cases
Whereas cases where involuntary and voluntary affiliations make possible
overt varieties of racism, what makes possible covert types has less to do with
voluntary attachments and more to do with involuntary ones. So, we will need to
travel to the underground and consider cases involving involuntary affiliations
and unspecified voluntary affiliations. The reason I am labeling voluntary
affiliations in these cases as “unspecified” is that it is possible that those who are
actively ignorant or implicitly biased are well-intentioned, but it is equally
possible that they are not—either they have attachments to anti-racist higherorder beliefs and values, or they don’t. Unless we can read minds, it is best to
leave their voluntary affiliations unspecified, because we don’t quite know their
status.
There may be some push-back from AI and IB against my “unspecified”
label because whites are inevitable generators of racism fed by the fuel of their
active ignorance and implicit biases. In other words, perhaps there is nothing
unspecified about their voluntary affiliations; it may just be the case that they
non-consciously voluntarily affiliate (as does the volitional racist) with their
whiteness, racist baggage in tow. Be that as it may, all I want to say here is that
what we can plausibly assume is that they are not necessarily volitional racists,
because they may not believe their prejudicial biases to be true, and they may not
be motivated to be unaware.
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If we grant this a plausible assumption to make, then how does the
affiliation diagnostic system help us understand how AI and IB are made
possible via involuntary affiliation?
By zeroing in on an involuntary affiliation to whiteness, we can diagnose
how this works. Recall from above that a subject’s involuntary affiliations likely
influence her psychology. These influences likely betray conscious choice and
may produce unnoticed beliefs and values absorbed at a lower order, which in
the present case are associated with whiteness (e.g., social capital and/or
nonconscious prejudices). Now, if there are no clear voluntary anti-racist or racist
affiliations (which we have labeled as “unspecified”), then we can say their
behavior is likely determined by their involuntary affiliation to whiteness. So,
whatever their voluntary affiliations, the conditions of possibility of AI and IB
can be said to be the subject’s involuntary affiliations.
1.3.2. Benefits of the Diagnostic System
Let us take stock. In section 1.1 we surveyed some varieties of racism
representative of the literature, and in section 1.2 we saw how we might reduce
various varieties of racism to some one thing. We have seen the pitfalls of the
fragmented (the “many”) and reductive (the “one”) approaches. The affiliation
diagnostic system (ADS) dissolves the dilemma between choosing the many over
the one. All I have tried to do is show that the ADS is a way of thinking at a second
order that makes sense of the whole of the literature by non-reductively unifying
different varieties of racism. What I offered is a connective tissue that shows
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what makes any type of racism possible. The ADS offers a unifying approach
that subsumes reductionists and non-reductionists alike, with no fixed meaning
to racism identical in every case.
But allow me to spell out in a little detail the ADS’s desirability and
benefits. Generally, the benefits of the diagnostic system are that it helps our
thinking about racism by offering a meta-theoretical perspective that can unify
any type of racism in a commonsense way, a global view of the literature without
sacrificing the explanatory power of any one view while being sensitive to their
differences. We do not need to undermine, replace, or reduce any view. But let us
consider more specifically the desirability of the ADS methodologically and by
reference to praxis.
The ADS is methodologically desirable because it offers a framework for
thinking that buys us out of the dilemma, a second-order map that enriches and
integrates our understanding of racisms.25 We can avoid the undesirable
consequences of each horn of the dilemma: possible misidentification of racist
phenomena due to narrow overspecialized approaches (horn 1), and the denial
of nuance and epistemic privilege (horn 2). The ADS avoids the consequences of
horn 1, because it offers a way of thinking that is not confused or mistaken about

But what of institutional and structural racisms? One might say that this exists independently
of conscious human experience, and thus cannot be diagnosed by the affiliation framework,
relying as it does on subject-group connection. We can understand institutional and structural
racisms as depending on a network of interrelated involuntary and voluntary affiliations. A firstorder theory of structural racism that understands it as a system produced and sustained by
white supremacy can be thought through at a second-order by seeing it as conceptually
depending on subjects who voluntarily affiliate with groups whose set of beliefs have it that the
benefits of structural racism are too good to eschew, and at the same time, subjects who are
involuntarily affiliated with whiteness who reap those benefits whether they want to or not.
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what we are trying to understand—we know the sorts of people we are talking
about and are not mistaking some racists for others. If we know what all the
specialized approaches depend on, then we are able to agree on what sorts of
affiliations are at stake. And if we know this, we can effectively judge which firstorder approach is the correct one for the phenomenon at hand, because we have
a simple diagnostic toolkit that illuminates the kind of affiliation(s) that makes
the approach and phenomenon possible. It is all conceptualizable in easy-tounderstand terms that does not depend on special academic or scientific
knowledge, and so it is easily digestible by the public. Anyone can understand
what is basic to racism, and anyone can understand why racism takes the various
forms it does, those explained in the literature. We see the whole and can
communicate it simply and effectively, without the technical and narrow expert
testimony of academic sub-fields. This has obvious practical benefits, which I
address in the next section, about getting people on board with the findings of
the first-order positions.
Another benefit is its capacity to unify the varieties of racism, which is
desirable because otherwise we may reject or ignore particular varieties of racism
as well as the epistemic privilege of non-white philosophers of race. This is due
to the ADS’s non-reductive strategy, which allows each type of racism to explain
its target phenomenon. As I showed in section 1.2, there are reasons that a
reductive approach centering on one boiled-down explanation is unlikely to
yield a be-all and end-all view. Has Glasgow ended the conversation? Can we
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pack our things and head home? The point of taking a non-reductive approach is
to appreciate that each variety of racism has something important to say and that
jettisoning one (or more) in the service of reductive simplicity may leave us high
and dry where it comes to explaining some more nuanced, genuine racist
phenomena.
The point so far is that the ADS methodologically retains. Retention—i.e.,
preserving the autonomy of any variety of racism—is desirable because we can
continue to let each type of racism describe its own phenomena well. The ADS
allows us to put them together in a way that does not privilege any one view
over another, picking out the right affiliation for the right theory. We should
want this, and it matters, because the varieties of racism all explain something
different, and we would miss out on aspects of racism were we not to retain the
autonomy of the disparate views of racism. We get all the explanatory merits
from all the positions that we would otherwise miss out on because they each
explain something different. They can continue to track the moving target of
racism, as well as what is new, what has not yet been explored or discovered,
and what might change in the future. But beyond unification and retention, the
ADS shows that we can think about racisms objectively while avoiding the
denial of epistemic privilege, because the ADS centers on the transcendental
conditions of possibility of human experience. What could be more central to
racism than human experience? Though this may be trivial, the ADS is a solid
ground, because anyone could assent to it. So, a white philosopher attempting to
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be objective about racism can do so without rejecting or infringing on
perspectives she does not have.
Finally, and by way of a brief preview of what follows, the ADS is
beneficial vis-à-vis praxis, which here refers to the amelioration of racism, how to
lessen it. If we buy into the lesson of the foregoing section, what should we now
do if our goal is to lessen racism? Should we pick one amelioration strategy or
sample them all? My thinking is that we put the ameliorative strategies together
for a complete picture, much like we did for the varieties of racism in this section,
where the strategy should fit the problem.
2. Unification to Amelioration
In this section we re-encounter a familiar constellation of themes: the
methodological blindness and limitations à la the “one” where with the hammer,
everything looks like a nail, as well as the narrow overspecialization à la the
“many” where more is done to complexify the issues instead of simplifying them
for the public. The section argues that non-reductively unifying racisms helps
orient our thinking about their amelioration, namely that a generalist approach
like that of section 1 is applicable to amelioration strategies. The point is that a
generalist approach is required because of methodological limitations and
overspecialization. Resultant public skepticism and blowback is what happens
when we cannot talk coherently to the public. So, what the generalist has to offer
is a way of thinking practically, a way to gather up the theoretical chaos and
speak clearly and coherently before leaping into praxis.
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2.1. Varieties of Racism, Ways of Ameliorating
There are two moves in this sub-section. The first is to appreciate and
acknowledge that the following views are legitimate and have an impact on
ameliorating racism. The second is to show that there is always more to the
amelioration story that these views cannot tell given how they understand
racism. The point is that while no approach to strategizing amelioration is
wrong, each is limited by how racism is described. By clearly and coherently
defining the problem in such a way as to highlight its wrongs, we can clearly
identify how to lessen the problem and ipso facto its wrongs. Now, I am not going
to offer a first-order all-inclusive amelioration program below, something which
“solves it all”. Rather, all I am trying to do is show that if each amelioration
strategy is taken as an island, then it cannot fundamentally make racisms better
outside that island. Each of these is a tool. Each works within a certain context.
What I am offering is the idea that if we do not see the whole, we get myopically
caught up with each specific amelioration strategy.
Social-structural Racism and Social Amelioration
If we define racism so as to mark off and draw out its socio-political
wrongness, then we have a readymade blueprint for combating racism. First, the
view locates racial oppression at the social-structural level, revealing the ways it
is baked into social institutions which maintain patterns of racial inequality and
injustice, shedding light on what might or would be required for mitigating its
harms. Second, it expands the concept of racism beyond the individual “bad
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apples”, where it is not enough to push the problem off to bad actors within a
society.
So, we can take racism in this sense to be a systematized network of
oppressive and dehumanizing forces which deprive a racial group of material
capital and sometimes life itself while uplifting and maintaining the social
position of the dominant oppressor group (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Omi
and Winant 1994; Harris 1999/2020; Feagin 2006). Some analytical approaches to
defining this social-structural concept of racism are prescriptive or normative,
with an eye toward criticizing the structure of a society which unjustly
disadvantages racial groups (Haslanger 2012, 367, 376, 385-387, Ch. 11; Urquidez
2020, Ch. 7). Whatever our definition and whichever analysis gets us to that
definition, what we end up with is a picture according to which racism is, at the
outset, a normatively-laden term.26 What this means is that the constraints set on
this view of racism lead to assessments on how to ameliorate it which come with
their own constraints. That is, if a social-structural explanation of racism is
prioritized, we need to come up with solely social-structural solutions to
ameliorate it.
We arrive, then, at views of what can be called social amelioration, by which
I mean attempts at lessening the socio-political and institutional nature of racism.
For instance, we might posit that racial progress and the dismantlement of
institutionalized racism depends on whites giving up their privileges and

Not everyone who is sympathetic to a structural view of racism agrees with a moralistic
starting point. See Shelby 2002 and Mills 2003.
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eliminating the ways in which they participate in and benefit from
“institutionalized pattens of racism” (Stikkers 2014, 16). Or perhaps we go for
insurrectionism, another strategy which calls for directly challenging a racially
unjust status quo to liberate racialized groups (Davis 1983, 1990; Harris 2002;
McBride 2013, 2017).27
On these views it makes perfect sense that cutting out the cancer of racist
social structures is the only way to alleviate racism, because each understands
racism in terms of social structures and institutions. These views have their
virtues, drawing awareness to institutional privileges and challenging the status
quo via activist scholarship. Each goal is one we should try to reach. But there is a
difference between theoretical goals and actual goals. What I mean by this
distinction is that there is a rift between ideals to which we aspire and whether
the aspirations are practically feasible. That is, the means by which we reach those
goals matter. Things get murky where we consider these goals as actual, as none
of them seem practically feasible. Each view sets out farfetched, often idealistic
means to achieve the goals of social amelioration, because it seems unlikely that
social forces can be overturned, especially if it is true that whites are inevitable
beneficiaries of racism. Goals that are morally praiseworthy but fundamentally
unattainable do not practically ameliorate racisms. Certainly, addressing

Or perhaps more radically, we assume Derrick Bell’s “racial realism” thesis (1992), as does
Tommie Curry (2007, 145), and consider the possibility that social amelioration is impossible and
instead advocate purely for liberation. We might then entertain the possibility that violence
against whites is the only way to solve anti-Black racism (134-135). This by-any-means-necessary
approach is a strategy about which I am agnostic.

27

66
structural racism is an important part of amelioration, but it is not the only part of
the story. If social amelioration is our only tool, then we limit how other varieties
of racism might be lessened.
Racism and AI: Epistemic and Habit Amelioration
How might we start changing minds and not just structures? Look to the
content of those minds—what people know and don’t know. We should worry
about how racism is generated by willfully ignorant whites with bad habits,
especially given that AI is structured by social-institutional forces which
maintain and manufacture white privilege and supremacy. Coupled with the
above, there are reasons that describing racism in this way is valuable. It features
how socio-cultural forces blind whites to their role in furthering structural
racism. But importantly, it also shows that whites welcome this blindness (as a
matter of conscious choice or not), because it serves the purpose of upholding a
racist status quo that whites are motivated not to recognize or acknowledge in
any meaningful way (Mills 1997, 2007). So, our first step should be getting aware
of structured ignorance and mending bad habits (Sullivan 2006; Hoagland 2007;
Outlaw 2007; MacMullan 2009; Medina 2013; Al-Saji 2014).
So, we get models of epistemic and habit amelioration, by which I mean
attempts at lessening racism as generated by AI by improving knowledge
practices and modifying habits for the better. For instance, we might argue for
developing epistemic virtues such as humility, curiosity, and open-mindedness
(Medina 2013, 42). Or perhaps we should appreciate and recognize relationality to
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see the interdependence between oppressor and oppressed to open better lines of
communication (Hoagland 2007). Still more, education that challenges the
dominant (white) perspective and mitigates ignorance may also be a necessary
strategy (Outlaw 2007). Any which way epistemic amelioration is spelled out, we
may begin to override certain ways of actively ignoring the status of the
oppressed.
Yet, beyond epistemic amelioration, white habits may still get in the way of
progress where AI is concerned. So, we may offer views of habit amelioration,
strategies which emphasize the modification of, or resistance to, habits of white
privilege (Sullivan 2006) and habits of whiteness (MacMullan 2009), or the
interruption of racializing habits of “seeing” (Al-Saji 2014). We may, then, begin
to counteract the maintenance of a white homogenized worldview. On these
views, addressing bad epistemic practices and habits is a way to lesson racism,
because they understand racism in terms of (a willful lack of) knowledge and
bad racialized habits. These views seem more realistic than the means for social
amelioration. They are helpful for shining a light on the ways whites are
unwittingly racist and provide tools for resisting racism that results from AI.
They are more practically realizable given their focus on explicit strategies
people can adopt.
Yet, alone, this too is not enough because there are people who know
better, care, and manage their racialized habits yet still demonstrate bias as the
Implicit Association Test shows us (Kelly and Roedder 2008). That is, IB, which is
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not a matter of knowledge or racialized habits, is left on the table, another set of
people otherwise un-ameliorated if we view matters only through the lens of AI.
Racism and IB: Trained Amelioration
Let us, then, turn to IB. If we understand racism (personal or structural) as
a result of people’s implicit biases, then again, we have a handy readymade
blueprint for lessening it: thwart the causes of implicit biases in the brain. There
are good reasons to describe racism as the result of IB. It does not make racism
out to be a wholly structural phenomenon, while at the same time appreciating
the force that socio-cultural racism has on individuals’ psychology. It opens our
eyes to the complicated matter of nonconscious racism.
So, it makes sense that amelioration here would involve training out
people’s biases, which I am calling trained amelioration. There are several
approaches for doing so. For instance, one strategy is to “break the habit” of
implicit bias by intervening on subjects so as to train them to become aware of
their automatic bias (Devine et al. 2012). Another is to cultivate “positive
personal contact” with members of an out-group which a study shows reduces
racial bias in police officers (Peruche and Plant 2006). Two further, competing
routes are on the one hand, to disaffirm stereotypes (Kawakami et al. 2000), and
on the other, to affirm counterstereotypes (Gawronski et al. 2008). The first route
finds that saying “no” to stereotypes with repeated practice reduced automatic
stereotyping. The second finds that saying “yes” to counterstereotypes after
training reduces the activation of stereotyping. On these views, to alleviate bias is
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to alleviate racism, because racism is understood as a kind of bias. So, we have
strategies that are more realistic for those who already know better, and helpful
for correcting people’s instant biased responses.
2.2. A Generalist’s Apology
Each of the amelioration strategies above lessen their target racisms within
their purview. Each is a tool that works within a certain context. Use the hammer
with the nail, the saw with the plank. But the point I want to make at this
juncture is that none lessen racism outside their purview, that if we do not see the
whole, it is likely that we will get caught up with each specific strategy and each
preferred description. With my hammer, everything looks like a nail; with my
saw, it all looks like planks. Still more, these parts alone do not buy everything
where it comes to ameliorating racism as a whole, and on their own, they may be
unconvincing to skeptics, the very people we want to convince, our targets in the
public. So, we need a generalist approach. We need to put ameliorations together
coherently so that we get a clear, general picture of how to think through
mitigating the whole of racism. But there is an immediate, obvious objection to
what I am saying. Given that piecemeal strategies ameliorate within their
purview, there is no need for a wholistic picture, no need for a master planner.
Each can operate on its own, within its purview, and chew away at various
aspects of the racist whole. So, we don’t need a unifying order. We don’t need a
whole.
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This much I concede. But the point is that the narrow specialization of
these strategies alienates the public and deepens their skepticism about racism. A
case in point is the recent demonization of Critical Race Theory.28 Again, as in
section 1.1., we need to ask: who are these descriptions of racism and
amelioration strategies for? Are they for me, an academic; are they for you, likely
another academic? All I am driving at is that the narrower our descriptions and
strategies get, the more extreme they get in their complexity. And the more
divorced from everyday experience they get, the easier it is for the public to be
skeptical. We are not trying to convince people who are already sympathetic; if
we want to sell a progressive liberal on the nuances of racism, then we might
give them a copy of Medina (2013). But I would venture that no one we are trying
to convince will say they “signed” the Racial Contract à la Mills (1997). We won’t
sell a racist cop on AI, and IB would likely be an uphill battle. A skeptical,
resistant public will likely have no patience for any of this, they will likely think
it is academic hogwash cooked up by eggheads, and not bother to understand it.
The idea is that what works for some might not work for others. But if we take
the time to talk about it, generally, they may come to understand it.
So, we need a generalist approach. As I said earlier, the philosopher’s role
should be a functionary one for the public. We should elucidate, not complicate.
The best moral goals in the world don’t matter if they are unconvincing and
likely to never happen. To reiterate what I asked in 1.1., what could be more

For some overviews and examples of what I am referring to, see Butcher and Gonzalez (2020),
Krasne (2020), Goldberg (2021), Harris (2021), and Sawchuck (2021).
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ameliorative than something the public could understand and get on board with?
A cross-specialization generalist can coherently create a bigger picture, because
with a big picture, we can clearly identify our phenomena, our audience, and our
amelioration strategy. This is praxis at its best. It matters how you present it. All
the meta-theoretical straightening out now matters.
So, the point I am driving home is this: let’s get things clear descriptively in
order to make things better, because the way we describe can either limit or
unshackle the way we prescribe. We shouldn’t obfuscate moral issues and
practical ones. The former are aspirational goals. The latter are a process. Now, I
am not suggesting that we divorce descriptive work from a moral context. How
could we, given that our target is racism? Rather, what I am suggesting is that we
should not let moralistic upshots and programs define our descriptive work.
Letting any one of the above approaches determine how we capture racism not
only misses different kinds of racisms, but puts blinders around our eyes,
keeping us from seeing how to make racism as such better. So, not doing neutral
descriptive work leads to consequences that are not as good as they could be for
racism itself, just for particular varieties of racism. The reason thinking through
the theoretical, descriptive apparatus is important is that it gives us practical
purchase; it enables us to identify how to lessen racism as a whole. And none of
this must be mysterious. I showed that we are not, and need not be, limited by
our descriptions by putting racisms together where the formal ground is the way
humans affiliate with each other. Putting together a range of racisms by
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affiliation allows us to see how we can put together a range of ameliorative
strategies. No longer are we limited or constrained by how we understand
particular varieties of racism; we can see it as a whole. We should care about a
“sample” approach because the consequences are what matter most—the right
ameliorative tool for the right racist phenomenon. The consequences of weaving
together racisms are the ability to weave together ways of ameliorating it, a
combined picture of racism with a combined picture of amelioration helps us see
how to pick apart the practical problems we confront.
Conclusion
If different varieties of racism are ameliorable, then they are avoidable,
and if they are avoidable, then we can begin thinking about who or what is
responsible for racism. But this is tricky, because one’s thinking about
responsibility may well depend on one’s preferred description of racism and its
purported wrongs. Should we think about racism and responsibility in a
personal or socio-political sense? Should we go narrow or go broad? As luck
would have it, we have a set stage for thinking this through, because there are
individualized senses of racism and of responsibility, and social senses of racism
and of responsibility. So, if we choose to go narrow and focus on individual
racism, then we can make use of an individualistic account of responsibility to
say that so-and-so is personally responsible for their racism. But we could choose
to go broad, focusing on social racism, and make use of a social account of
responsibility to make a case for social responsibility for racism. So, should we
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pick one over the other? Should we emphasize one over the other? What is the
cost of doing so?
My thinking is that we will run into a familiar hitch: if you prefer a social
understanding of racism, you will likely prefer a social/civic sense of
responsibility. If you prefer a personal understanding of racism, you will likely
prefer an individualistic sense of responsibility.29 If we hunker down in either
camp, then we create responsibility loopholes. If we locate responsibility at the
individual level, then so long as one is not actively racist, then one no longer has
any accountability outside oneself. But if we locate responsibility at the social
level, then one can evade responsibility by claiming it is unfair to be held to
account for an unchosen participation in systems of oppression that one did not
“sign up for”.
My thinking is that before asking who or what is responsible for racism, we
should first re-frame the very idea of responsibility—the topic of chapter 4. What
we have seen so far is that there is no straightforward way of locating
responsibility in the sphere of individuals or society without losing out on one or
the other. So, there is something to learn from racism which makes it a kind of
methodology, an approach for thinking through other philosophical problems
like that of responsibility. The next chapter will provide some headway towards
thinking through how the personal and the social-structural intersect—that

Where and why do such preferences arise? Although I will not discuss this further, I would
wager that they have something to do with one’s attitude towards what can be done in terms of
amelioration and hence what we are responsible for.
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social-structures play out in the individual’s mind—the nexus point of the two.
This will, in turn, provide headway into answering how we ought to re-think
responsibility, doing away with the binary between the social and the individual.

75
Chapter 3
Overlooking: It Could Happen to You
Introduction
“Yes, all whites are racist, but not me.” Is this what any philosophically
educated white person in the area of race and racism would say? Probably not. Is
this what they might assume about themselves (consciously or not)? Perhaps so.
But why might they think so, and how might this psychological tension be
described? This chapter targets whites of this ilk by answering that question,
identifying a novel phenomenon of racism that I will call overlooking. These are
whites who know better and have anti-racist values, who do not seem to be
ignorant (actively or otherwise), nor are they acting in racist ways as a pervasive
pattern. Whites who know better and are not usually doing racist things may,
consciously or not, feel as if they are not part of whiteness as addressed by active
ignorance or implicit bias. In a similar vein to the phrase “I’m not a racist, but…”
such persons might suppose “I’m white, but….” This chapter does a bit of
performative amelioration, then, for the overlooker who might lurk in me, the
author, or (if the reader is white1) might lurk in you, too. Once we know about it,
we can take a hard look at ourselves, and perhaps prevent it.
Though this chapter’s first goal is to contribute a description of a novel
phenomenon of racism to the literature, the phenomenon is continuous with the

Of course, not all racists are white. So, what I have to say would hold for any racist person. But
my reason for singling out whites is that in terms of asymmetrical power, the effect of white
racism in terms of its harm is greater than other racisms perpetuated by other racial groups. See
Blum (2002a, 33-52) for a discussion of this point.
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legacy of the social-structural phenomena of active ignorance (AI) and the
psychological phenomena of implicit bias (IB). To demonstrate novelty, I will
argue why overlooking is not reducible to AI and IB, while noting continuity
with the sorts of racist phenomena those positions model. I will show that
overlooking continues what the AI and IB approaches have already started, a
further analysis of unintentional racist phenomena. It is not that I favor ignoring
social structures over individual psychology, but that these social forces play out
in our minds, where the social is the mind and the mind the social, a picture which
is mapped out by the previous chapter’s affiliation diagnostic system. Indeed, it
would be hard to imagine a contemporarily relevant account that denied social
structures, which might imply that we are all “done” with racism, hence tending
to contribute to and perpetuate it. Just as IB’s psychological lens shows how
social forces lead to whites as such being non-consciously biased, overlooking
offers a more psychologically complex manifestation of these same social
forces—showing us how individuals might non-consciously think they are
personally done with racism, given the right amount of knowledge and care. Both
senses generate smooth sailing for racial prejudice. Thus, while overlooking is
methodologically continuous with the ethos of AI and IB, it offers a new vein of
complexity with clear ramifications for those who think deeply about racism.
The primary aim of the chapter is to motivate a new conversation about
personal racism, that our conversation about racism should not depart entirely
from a focus on the individual. While I will mention some descriptive
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consequences of the chapter, I emphasize the moral and practical consequences
of overlooking. Specifically, I draw attention to moral evasion—escaping moral
accountability by appealing to exculpatory conditions—and argue that unlike AI
and IB, there is nothing in overlooking which implies evasion, either by shifting
blame to social-structural forces or automatic brain processing. In the conclusion
I highlight some undesirable practical implications of AI and IB. As it is
psychologically unrealistic to be in a constant state of shame and vigilance, I
argue that such views likely lapse into the sort of risky thinking that one has
arrived on the side of righteousness, that one is personally done with racism even
if whites in general are not. This implies an artificial division between those who
are “in the know” and those who are not, which has the potential to proliferate
unintentional racisms. I contend that overlooking dissolves this artificial division
and shows that no white person can claim to comfortably roost on the “in the
know” side of this division.
1. The Overlooking Phenomenon
Consider Kim, who is a white professor of critical race theory. She is an
expert in the field, having devoted her entire career to its study. Her particular
research emphasis is racism in all its various guises. Clearly, Kim is
knowledgeable about such matters. When confronted time and again with
difficult and uncomfortable truths about her participation in, and benefitting
from, social networks of white privilege and supremacy at the expense of people
of color, she is not so fragile as to back down from recognizing her role in that
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social situation. She does not resist knowing more about her complicity. Though
she has never herself experienced racism, she has nonetheless devoted her life to
understanding it, speaking and writing about it, doing consultant work with area
businesses, and to engaging in public demonstrations seeking to raise awareness
about it. She’s been arrested at demonstrations, most recently during the summer
of 2020 while marching at a Black Lives Matter protest. She takes seriously what
she’s come to know; she cares.
But while she devotes herself to study, and to antiracist activism, she does
not attempt to delude herself into thinking that she has “arrived” at some
antiracist or non-racist ideal. Aside from people of color, who would know and
care more than Kim?2 But she hasn’t gone through life without some near misses
and embarrassing slipups. Let’s say that Kim has just watched a documentary
about the antebellum South. Shortly thereafter, Kim helps her Black colleague
carry heavy boxes of books to a new office and begins whistling the opening note
of “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot” (a song featured in the documentary). She stops
herself, realizing all in a flash that whistling the tune would be to thoroughly
ignore the history of slavery associated with the spiritual that could be offensive
and cause harm to her black colleague. Now, this is not something that always
happens to Kim. She’s not always slipping up, and she does stop herself from

The first clause of this sentence is meant to show my commitment to subjective perspectives laid
out in chapter 1. Kim has no complete first-hand experience or experience-based knowledge of
what it is like to be a person of color, though of course this does not rule out that she can
analogize her own possible experiences of other forms oppression to that of racism.
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whistling the full melody. Nevertheless, Kim is not perfect, and she sometimes
overlooks what she would otherwise not choose to do.3
A case like Kim’s can happen to anyone. You might recall doing
something like the above or know someone who did. You probably know
someone like Kim. You might be Kim. We all know of embarrassing cases like
this. What the example suggests is that the right kinds of knowledge, values,
affiliations, and/or experiences are not prophylactics against the phenomenon.
Kim knows better and cares, but it makes no difference. She nevertheless
overlooks. The example shows, prima facie, that overlooking is accidental, that
despite knowing better and caring about something, one can do what one
otherwise would not consciously choose to do.
Other examples besides the case of Kim can be offered. For instance,
consider a corporate drone who has personal experience with races other than
his own—e.g., he has learned about issues from friends, grew up and lives in a
racially diverse community, and is affiliated with people of color. Let’s say he
has an attached “wokeness”. He has a personal commitment to antiracism and
strong progressive leanings. He cares. In any event, he works in a skyscraper,
and he’s annoyed at having to take a long elevator ride to the ground floor so he
can go outside to smoke. On one elevator ride down, he says, “If only it were the
50’s again,” gesturing to his cigarettes, despite knowing what the decade was

Other examples of overlooking could have different degrees of harm. They could also have
different degrees of knowledge, care, control, and awareness. The case of Kim is but one example
of the phenomenon.
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like for black people.4 Some of his black colleagues are in the elevator. He
becomes aware of his action all in a flash.
Or consider a software program developer who has an experienced
understanding of structural racism and is by all measures well-informed. Like
the smoker, she’s a committed antiracist. Suppose she is tasked with designing a
healthcare algorithm. She designs the algorithm for health institutions to
determine access to special healthcare based on need for such access (e.g., highrisk illnesses). She uses “costs” as a stand-in for “need based on illness”. Once set
into motion, the algorithm contains a critical bias against black patients, since
significantly less is spent on this group in comparison to whites.5 As a result,
black patients are not selected as needing special care—they appear to be of better
health than just-as-sick whites. She becomes appallingly aware of her action’s
import sometime later.
One should wonder how much the overlooking phenomenon occurs.
While I offer other examples besides Kim, I focus specifically on her case because
scenarios like it are, I’d wager, ubiquitous. The phenomenon hits many whites
where they live—those who think they have put in the work, that they are
knowledgeable and care. Yet, they nevertheless watch their racism unfold before
their very eyes. There is nothing eccentric about overlooking, and if it is
ubiquitous, then we should focus our attention on it. I have overlooked, and

Let’s say he’s been binge-watching the show Mad Men lately.
See Obermeyer et al. (2019) and Evans et al. (2020) from whom I draw inspiration for this
example.
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perhaps you have, too. Overlooking is meant to demonstrate an “insider’s”
account of white racism, not by appeal to notions such as white guilt or fragility,
but in a way that is well-grounded in the white perspective—what it feels like to
participate in whiteness from the point of view of the white person.
1.1. What is Overlooking?
The overlooking phenomenon is a species of what I am calling
unintentional racism.6 By “unintentional racism” I mean racism which is not done
on purpose or deliberately, with no aim in mind, and involving no willing or
desiring. It is accidental. The example illustrates that Kim has no motivation
towards racist actions. Given her epistemic competencies and values, she would
not have acted as she did if she had consciously chosen her action.
Just so we are on the same page, I am going to formalize this as a matter of
clarity. Just as typos are kinds of mistakes where one fails to enact what one
knows and values (e.g., proper grammar), the same goes for overlooking. By
“overlooking” I mean a psychological mishap, where when a subject S overlooks:
S (a) unintentionally fails to remember facts about the world and remember
something she knows about the world which results in (b) S performing action φ
due to forgetfulness over and against possible action ψ despite S’s otherwise
knowing that ψ was the more appropriate action given her value scheme. By
“psychological mishap” I mean a cognitive lapse where an otherwise informed

6 There

may be other phenomena of unintentional racism beyond overlooking, but I will not
explore them in this chapter. Some racist events caused by active ignorance and implicit bias
arguably fit under the label unintentional racism as well, though I will not defend that claim here.
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subject acts in a way she would not have if she were presently mindful of the
circumstantially relevant information.7 By “forgetfulness” I simply mean failing
to remember something. Here, when subjects forget, they fail to remember
something they otherwise know. Subjects are liable to make unintentional
mistakes even when they are informed. By “informed” I mean being aware of
(i.e., noticing) and knowing some state of affairs. I draw no sharp distinction
between “maximally” and “minimally” informed. While this may be a way to
explain the differences between experts and non-experts, the point is that for our
purposes here, subjects are at least minimally knowledgeable.8
2. Active Ignorance, Implicit Bias, and Overlooking: Continuities and
Departures
Two existing models seemingly prepared to handle the example of Kim
are active ignorance (AI) and implicit bias (IB). Whereas one might expect that IB
is more promising than AI, I will show that it too will not work. The
phenomenon is not modeled well by either, because overlookers are not ignorant
(active or otherwise9) and have some conscious control over their actions. By
“model” I mean that these approaches do not apply well to the example, rather
than claiming that they are just wrong in toto. Yet, overlooking is not reducible to

This is similar to akrasia. But, overlooking is not akrasia. Akrasia involves conscious awareness—
more strongly, knowledge—of what one’s doing and lacking the will to do otherwise, whereas
overlookers may become aware, and sometimes have the will to do otherwise.
8 This point about minimally knowledgeable subjects is akin to the “thesis of cognitive
minimums” (Medina 2013, 127ff).
9 I write “active or otherwise” to express the distinction between active and accidental ignorance as
drawn by Bailey (2007, 77). The former applies to deliberate refusals to know, while the latter
applies to the ordinary sense of ignorance where this means a lack of knowledge which can be
filled in.
7
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AI or IB, because it does not match the explanatory approaches or assumptions
of either model. These two positions only tell half the story of overlooking
because they do not explain the conflict which Kim so obviously experiences.
Thus, while there are some aspects of the overlooking phenomenon for which AI
and IB can provide clarity, I demonstrate that the example is truly a novel
phenomenon of racism.
2.1. Active Ignorance and Overlooking
Suppose that upon immediate assessment we are inclined to say
overlooking seems to be a form of ignorance, that it is either explainable by or
reducible to it. One conventional approach taken by theorists of AI involves a
point about white resistance to knowledge of racism in any of its forms (Mills
2007; Bailey 2007; Medina 2013). Supplementarily, some approaches focus on a
lack of motivation to know that whiteness is a maintenance of a racist status quo
(Mills 1997; Sullivan 2006; Alcoff 2007; DiAngelo 2011, 2018). Whether as a means
to maintain one’s social position and capital or as a function of bad epistemic
practices, it is perhaps the case that overlooking is just a token of the AI type.
In this spirit, we might say that, generally, overlooking is explainable by
the structural forces that maintain white ignorance (e.g., white privilege and white
supremacy) and is thereby another instance of the “epistemology of ignorance”
(Mills 1997, 2007). The basic approach here would be to claim that white folks,
globally, are all ignorant to some extent, in which case AI could explain
overlooking. Kim is just a token of an ignorant white type, and so it is in virtue of
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her whiteness that she succumbed to the forces of white ignorance. It is therefore
not enough to say, by caveat, that Kim is not ignorant.
Let us build the case further. Charles Mills (1997), for instance, explains
that whites are socially motivated to refuse their own state of ignorance. They are
necessarily ignorant that they are ignorant. Through the creation of the Racial
Contract, whites have effectively blinded themselves. White ignorance is
deliberately designed and enacted to enable participation and benefit from
racialized social inequalities. Thus, even where there is clear evidence that racial
injustices exist, actively ignorant subjects are motivated not to know so as to
maintain their privileged social position. So, that overlookers are not “presently
mindful of the circumstantially relevant information” could be taken to mean
that they have non-consciously succumbed to the normative force of the Racial
Contract, a “structured blindness” to anything related to race (19). Despite their
knowledge and care, overlookers cannot escape the “cognitive dysfunctions”
(18), or “difficulties” (93), generated by the principles prescribed in the Contract.
The dysfunctional thinking identified by Mills is paradoxically functional insofar
as it serves a psychological and social function of reinforcing the validity of a
white homogenized worldview. The overlookers’ inability to think from
perspectives not their own is also dysfunctional in a broader rational sense—of
validating an irrational racist worldview—but, additionally, serves a normative
function of valuing that worldview to the extent where others are sometimes not
known to exist.
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In cases of overlooking, however, there is no blindness to others’
perspectives as a pervasive pattern. Rather than “global cognitive dysfunctions”,
overlooking involves cases of “local” or “episodic” cognitive dysfunction. For the
overlooker, the dysfunction that Mills describes serves no paradoxical functional
purpose whatsoever because she does not seek homogenization or
marginalization of the perspective of other races. That value is something to
which the overlooker would not subscribe, and yet her actions betray exactly that
value. This indicates that at some level this social normative force is operative in
the overlooker, even though it is contrary to a broader epistemic and value
system she employs in most cases. Thus, it may be true that Kim cannot escape
these forces, but that does not entail that she cannot ever resist them. Is the
person who has committed her life to studying race and racism utterly ignorant,
with no control over her actions? It seems more plausible that folks like Kim do
know better but are still susceptible to racism as generated by the kind of global
white ignorance theorized by epistemologists of active ignorance.10
Be that as it may, we could entertain more specific routes that might
reduce overlooking to AI, namely that: (1) overlooking is a function of bad
epistemic practices and a lack of motivation to know better, or (2) there is some
ignorance in the moment of overlooking.11 I will take up each of these routes and
show that neither entirely pass muster.

This, of course, is not to say that there are not totally ignorant whites in the sense that Mills
identifies.
11 We might construe forgetting as a kind of ignorance, that overlookers are motivated to forget
what they already know. Perhaps they are “motivated” by the “habits of white privilege”
10
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Perhaps overlooking can be captured as a mode of resistance for the
protection of white privilege and white social capital (Medina 2013)—the result
of some epistemic vice revealing the overlooker’s avoidance or unacknowledgement of any evidence that may threaten their socially privileged
position. They may be, in José Medina’s terminology, epistemically arrogant,
thinking that (whether they are minimally or maximally informed) they have
arrived at “enough” knowledge about race, racism, and structural oppression
that they need not try to know more about the perspectives of those who are
oppressed (30-33). This would explain the accidental nature of overlooking, that
taking oneself to already know better and to care enough eliminates any need to
be vigilant of possible racism. And so, it would seem that overlooking can be
handled by appeal to epistemic arrogance, and thus reducible to AI.
But how could the foregoing be true, given that overlookers want to know
and care about knowing? As a critical race theorist, Kim has devoted her life to
understanding race and racism. It would be unlikely that she does not care at all.
If it is true that whites like Kim can never genuinely know how racism operates
or her position in a privilege-domination-oppression nexus, then why would she
continue to seek understanding? It could only, then, be that she really cares
about knowing better. Kim has clear attachments to antiracist values, and
whether it is by education, experience, or affiliation, she is informed and

operating as un- and sub-conscious defense mechanisms serving the maintenance of white
privilege (Sullivan 2006) or by their “white fragility” (DiAngelo 2011, 2018), and so they have a
tendency to forget that which is possibly racist from time to time. But, unless Plato’s recollection
theory of knowledge is correct, this would be absurd; one cannot forget what one does not know.
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motivated to be informed.12 There is neither a refusal to know or acknowledge
racial injustices and structural oppression (Bailey 2007; DiAngelo 2011, 2018), nor
an encompassing closed-mindedness (Medina 2013, 35-36), nor a blindness to a
world which uplifts her position at the expense of people of color (Sullivan 2006).
Thus, unless forgetting is a bad epistemic practice, which is unlikely, this route
seems to encounter a dead end.
Yet perhaps we should not be too quick to proclaim that Kim is not
arrogant. She may not be shot through with arrogance, nor even usually
arrogant. But maybe some part of Kim is arrogant, she thinks she is done and does
not need to be on the lookout. While she may not be pervasively epistemically
arrogant, it could be the case that she is sometimes arrogant in the moment of
overlooking. This takes us to the claim that ignorance is perhaps operative in the
moment of overlooking. A momentary not-knowing is something anyone
experiences. So, let us suppose that in addition to epistemic arrogance,
“ignorance in the moment” means something like George Yancy’s (2008) notion
that whiteness can sometimes “ambush” even well-meaning, antiracist white
people, where this means “being snared and trapped unexpectedly” by one’s
whiteness (229). On this supposition, it might just be that an overlooker takes
herself to have “arrived” at the antiracist ideal and suddenly (in the moment)

12 Of

course, knowledge is not sufficient without values—knowledgeable sociopaths exist, after all.
For overlookers, it is only because they are motivated by what they value to know better and act
accordingly. Yet, what overlooking presents is how that link between knowing better and acting
accordingly breaks down.
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“undergoes a surprise attack” (229), perhaps by nearly whistling “Swing Low,
Sweet Chariot” while helping a black colleague lift some heavy boxes.13
Now, the foregoing phenomena are all valid; I do not reject that they
occur. But even if these occurrences describe the overlooker in the moment, they
do not at all explain the conflict that happens in the overlooker’s mind—i.e., the
reasons why she sometimes does not act in accordance with her beliefs and
values—and so they only tell half the story of the phenomenon. All these
phenomena can do is describe certain environmental conditions which make
“slipups” possible. They are kinds of external determinants which say nothing
about what is happening in the mind itself, why Kim has the conflict she has.
Why is Kim on one day being ambushed, but on the next day isn’t? There is
nothing specific to overlooking that suggests these things are always happening
as a pervasive pattern, a point which will continue to bear fruit below in the
critique of IB. On the contrary, that Kim is who she is suggests that it is probable
that she is vigilant about ambushes. What is more is that there is nothing in the
example or description of overlooking suggesting that subjects have, or
consciously take themselves to have, arrived at an antiracist end. If the “surprise
attack” occurs only when subjects consciously consider themselves to have

Perhaps overlooking “in the moment” might also be partially captured by Sullivan’s (2006)
“ontological expansiveness” (10), where not having been harmed by stereotypes, prejudices, or
racism generates an ease of connection to one’s environment with carefree feelings and no
concerns aside from oneself into which white folk slide. These experiences could create the
conditions where, in the moment of overlooking, overlookers are in a state of momentary
ignorance, effectively not knowing what they are doing.
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arrived at an antiracist end, then it is unlikely that overlookers are falling prey to
an ambush.
Although it may not be a pervasive part of her behavior (i.e., she is not
always being ambushed), maybe Kim non-consciously believes that she has
arrived at an antiracist end, and that she already knows enough. Some part of
her may simply think she is not susceptible to the features of active ignorance
Medina and Yancy address. This seems more sophisticated than asserting that
Kim is simply a token of the normative force of whiteness. There is no getting
around the social-structural processes of white privilege and supremacy, and
these processes bleed into the minds of even the most “virtuous” of white folk.
So, while overlooking is not reducible to AI, the position helps to show us just
how pernicious social-structural forces can be, that even a subject such as Kim
can succumb to that which she explicitly disavows. Yet, none of what is
characteristic of AI explains the inner conflict in Kim’s mind—doing what she
otherwise would not have done. Thus, overlooking is not just a form of AI,
contrary to our immediate assessment. So, we are left with Kim’s internal
psychological conflict unexplained, something which ought to be explained.
Perhaps IB can complete the story by reducing Kim’s mishap to her automatic
brain processing. Though she is not wantonly racist and sometimes exercises
control over her actions, we might say IB deftly handles those instances where
things go wrong for Kim, a question to which I will now turn.
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2.2. Implicit Bias and Overlooking
Even if AI does not tell the entire story of overlooking, IB may yet fill in
the details. But before we get to why overlooking may be reducible to IB, let us
begin with some preliminaries. The conventional approach to IB is underpinned
by dual-system theory, an empirical psychological account of informationprocessing where the mind consists of two systems responsible for two processes
(Stanovich and West 2000; Kahneman 2011). System 1 is a fast, automatic, and
involuntary processing which is prone to bias; System 2 is a slow, deliberative,
and voluntary processing that is rule-governed (Kahneman, 20-24). IB relies
solely on System 1, which will have serious consequences for its capacity to
capture overlooking.
Perhaps it could be argued that (1) the failure to enact one’s knowledge
and values yielding unintentionally racist acts is just a different way of saying
that anyone at all can succumb to biases outside their control. We might also say
that (2) the overlooker’s “psychological mishap” is explainable by automatic
System 1 processing in the mind of which she is unaware. Though it would seem
that IB neatly overlaps with overlooking such that the phenomenon is not novel,
I will argue that neither of these claims are all right, thus showing that
overlooking is irreducible to IB.
It may be the case that the failure to enact knowledge and values is just a
different way of saying that overlookers did or could not exercise any control
over their biases. So, their mishaps seem easily explainable: their failure to enact
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what they know and care about is simply a function of the uncontrolled
operation of bias, an automatic System 1 process. But is it plausible that Kim
could never stop herself from acting in biased ways? If not, then what is it, within
Kim, that allows her some measure of control over her behavior? And what could
“some measure of control” mean? There must be something preventing her from
always being biased. But for IB, there just is not an explicit empirical mechanism
that would explain this capacity in Kim. There is some conceptual
acknowledgement of control: that there is usually none (Kahneman 2011), some proactive control (Amodio and Swencionis 2018), or that biases cannot be controlled
directly (Holroyd 2012), where “implicit” usually implies a lack of conscious
control (Hardin and Banaji 2013). But what explains Kim’s control? Curiously,
there is nothing at all in IB to do so, but the empirical foundations of IB, dualsystem theory, offers an easily understandable explanation: System 2 regulates
System 1.14 In the same way, for example, I might be prone to overestimating the
number of cars on the road that are like my own (an example of the “availability
bias”; Kahneman 2011, 131-135, 425-427), I can stop (i.e., I can regulate) my
automatic thinking by being aware of my own humanly biased tendencies—“I
just think that, because I’m on the lookout for that car, and not because there

Now, the automatic-System 1/controlled-System 2 binary (see Frankish 2010, 922) that is
foundational to the dual-system theory upon which IB relies (Banaji and Greenwald 2016, 54-58)
suggests that we can, over time, significantly reduce bias by “breaking the habit” of bias (Devine
et al. 2012), perhaps through bias training (Correll et al. 2007; Gawronski et al. 2008), or “positive
personal contact” with out-group members (Peruche and Plant 2006). But whichever way we slice
control, some kind of external pressure is applied (i.e., training), and this externality, as I will
explain shortly, is the crucial differentiator to overlooking.
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really are more of that kind of car.” The crucial difference between this level of
regulative control and IB is that there is no internal higher-order ability to prevent
oneself from doing or saying stereotypical things. One just, for instance, takes an
anti-IB training, and then (presumably?) one cuts the bias off at the source. Is one
then done with racism? This seems implausible, and worse yet, implies that those
who are trained might take it to mean that they are all through with racism,
stereotyping, prejudice, and so forth. This is the sort of thinking that might let us
“off the moral hook”, as it were. Yet the import of overlooking is that we are
never finished.
How is Kim’s capacity to prevent bias different than IB’s anti-bias
training? The question I am pushing here is not whether there is control or not,
but instead, where is control located? Kim’s “regulation” differs from IB training
because the latter’s “regulation” is external. One relies on others to help one
control one’s actions and automatic thinking, instead of taking a serious look at
oneself. The difference is precisely that Kim is capable of internal regulation.
Training System 1 (for IB) is about conditioning a certain stimulus with a certain
response, involving no System 2 processes whatsoever (Kawakami et al. 2000;
Blair et al. 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald 2001; Devine et al. 2012). The general
idea is that post-conditioning, subjects automatically react “correctly” every (or
most of the) time. But for the overlooker, System 2 actively, deliberatively
controls (i.e., regulates) System 1 responses, rather than exercising conditioned
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mechanical, rote responses.15 In Kantian language, control for the externally
conditioned on IB is heteronomous, whereas for the overlooker, control is
autonomous.16
The chief descriptive insight of dual-system processing is not only that
agents succumb to bias, but that they may also process information rationally,
according to their higher-order beliefs and values. The chief normative insight, as
seen in second-generation (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) dual-system researchers, is
that agents ought to regulate their tendency towards biases by engaging System 2.
That is, anyone can regulate their automatic impulses, provided they have the
right higher-order beliefs and values to do so, though no one can regulate
perfectly all the time. It is therefore implausible to suppose that Kim has no
internal control over her own actions, and if she does have internal control, then
her overlooking is not reducible to IB. Kim’s System 2 regulation is clearly part
her story; we cannot simply say that automatic System 1 processing is always
what is responsible for Kim’s behaviors and actions. If that were the case, Kim
would not just make the occasional error, but instead would make systematic
predictable errors (Kahneman 2011, 270), acting on every racist impulse that
“pops” into her head. But once one has a properly functioning System 2 (i.e., one
knows better and is able to regulate one’s automatic responses), one then does

This is not even to mention that training out biases does not necessarily entail that subjects
arrive at new or revised beliefs and values such as, for example, a belief in the value of antiracism and a motivation to care about it.
16 For example, IB seminars for police officers involve an external party training the officers who
need to be “enlightened” (Peruche & Plant 2006; Correll et al. 2007). But the spirit of the
overlooker is that she does not need others to do the work for her.
15
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not always act on those biases even if they still live in the mind as heuristics. As
was the case with internal conflict (unexplained by AI) above, this internal
System 2 regulation (unexplained by IB) is an element of overlooking that ought
to be explained for a developed explanation of the phenomenon.
The overlooker’s internal regulation thus belies the general construal of IB,
where race is concerned, as an automatic, involuntary prejudicially biased
response. Though even well-intentioned, self-described antiracists are
susceptible to such responses (Kelly and Roedder 2008, 525-526), as in the
“ambush” phenomenon presented above, given the capacity for internal
regulation, overlookers are not prejudiced beyond all control, and do not
generally act prejudicially. It is not farfetched to presume that someone like Kim,
a white professor of race and racism, is probably not always biased against people
of color. Were Kim simply implicitly biased, then she would behave as such
either all of the time, or at a minimum, most of the time. While there are certainly
people who are likely to do this, this does not describe Kim. Rather, she is
susceptible (as we all are) to making these sorts of errors. Similar to the foregoing
critique of AI, there is a lack of a pervasive pattern of biased behavior. So, assuming
a view where everyone is determined by their biases to act prejudicially is eluded
by overlookers: they neither consciously undertake racist actions, nor do they
have no conscious control over them. The partial control here just means that
sometimes System 2 works and sometimes it does not—for overlookers the
agential “light switch” is neither just on nor just off, by which I mean there is
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neither complete control nor no control at all. More often than not, overlookers
have the capacity to do otherwise. They are free—minimally in the sense that
they could have done otherwise—rather than always (implicitly) mechanically
determined by bias. It would seem a plausible assumption to make that someone
like Kim retains this partial control emblematic of overlooking.
Yet, even if overlookers exhibit no pervasive pattern of uncontrolled
biased behavior, it could be argued that overlookers’ psychological mishaps are
reducible to System 1 processing, where “mishap” can be construed as the direct
result of being unaware of one’s biases in the moment of overlooking. Lack of
awareness is a central feature of implicit bias (Kelly and Roedder 2008;
Kahneman 2011; Banaji and Greenwald 2016). On dual-system theory, heuristic
associations (cognitive shortcuts) of which we are unaware cause stereotyping,
where System 1 hijacks System 2 (Kahneman, 24-25). Concerning race, implicit
bias dredges up stereotypes—e.g., automatically associating “Black person” with
“violent”—which implicitly influence judgments, actions, and attitudes (Kelly
and Roedder 2008). Subjects are generally unaware of their biases and are much
less likely to recognize their actions in the moment, much like what occurs when
one takes an Implicit Association Test (Banaji and Greenwald 2016, 34-56). Thus,
it seems plausible that overlooking is an example of IB without the empiricalpsychological vocabulary.
But if it were true that subjects generally lack an awareness of their biases
in the moment, then it would seem impossible that overlookers may become
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aware of their biases. Is it plausible that Kim, for example, would really never
realize or be aware of her possibly or actually biased behavior? This does not
square with Kim’s realizing what she almost did “all in a flash” whistling the
start of “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,” where that means something to the effect
that she instantaneously recognizes that she would have made a racially
insensitive association between helping a black colleague with some labor along
with whistling a slave spiritual. Were we to call Kim’s association a bias, then it
is unlikely that she recognized her action in the moment. Moreover, the sort of
mishap we see in the case of Kim does not seem readily explainable by appealing
to her hidden biases. We would have to say that she associated, somehow, “Black
colleague + labor” with “the slave spiritual, ‘Swing Low, Sweet Chariot’”. But
this would betray an unconvincing reading of bias as mapped onto what is a
more sophisticated internal psychological conflict between committed-to beliefs
and values (antiracism) and those which are reflectively eschewed (racist
symbolism), even if both can be construed as accidental in nature. The point is
that even if we were to construe Kim’s behavior as a matter of IB, the suggestion
that she may never become aware of her biases in the moment or even ex post
facto does not map onto her lack of pervasively biased behavior.
3. Three Impacts of Overlooking
This section draws out three broad implications of the overlooking
phenomenon. First, I raise a brief point about describing racism, where I sketch
germinal ideas about future directions for thinking about racism which come to
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light via overlooking. Second, I fill in some details about the overlooker’s
capacity to internally regulate her overlooking acts by offering a new and different
description of amelioration.17 Third, I raise some worries about moral evasion
implied by AI and IB and explain why no such evasion is available for the
overlooker.
3.1. Description
The fundamental point I want to draw attention to is that overlooking
opens our eyes to the way in which social-structural processes play out in
individual psychology. Further, what overlooking shows is that there is no
reason to plant a flag in either a social-structural or an individualistic approach.
By “play out” I mean the effect social-structural processes have from within a
subject’s cognition. Now, this is a point about method—how racist phenomena
are approached—and not a metaphysical point that social-structures only exist
because of individual psychology. IB opens up a frontier to be explored, one
which goes beyond either the social-structural or individual and locates the interrelation between the two within a subject’s mind; that is, the new frontier to
thinking through racism is to see that the social is the mind, and the mind the
social.
My point here is motivated by the following question: What more is there
to do from a social-structural perspective that has not already been done by AI?18

Different to, that is, the descriptions of amelioration we confronted in chapter 2.
For a recent move towards individualism while still appreciating social-structural/institutional
forces see Madva (2016).

17
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We know this phenomenon exists, and we know social-structural forces can
affect cognition.19 The idea is that we can agree with this view and expand out of
it by focusing on how social-structural processes play out in people’s minds. The
next frontier I am pushing for has to do with a view like IB as the next evolution
of social-structural analysis. Rather than just pointing to social structures, we
consider their deepest, most insidious impacts on the mind, something we might
not otherwise notice.
But why should we think through this more individualistic sense of
racism when IB already exists, and this is the sort of thing that might make
people racist beyond intentional hatred? The idea is that a more individualistic
analysis is still consistent with a social-structural analysis and can be thought of
as an extension of structuralism, even if it does not reduce to it. Social-structural
forces are the reason why inexplicit racist phenomena like overlooking are so
psychologically insidious. The point of talking about individual psychology in a
new way is not just to pair together structures + minds, but to take it further and
locate what exactly is going on in an individual’s mind where structural forces
play out. The benefit of doing so is not merely a matter of bridging individuals
and social structures, but rather that the nexus between the two allows us to
identify novel racist phenomena, phenomena with serious implications for those
who might non-consciously think their academic knowledge and commitments
put them beyond the reach of the structural forces of racism.

This is not to suggest the notion that racism is not captured by social-structures, but instead,
that not all aspects are explainable by social-structures.
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But how is it that social structures play out in individual psychology, how
is such a thing possible? This is, at first blush, an odd claim. But recall from
chapter 2 that we have in our possession a tool to show how this is possible,
namely the affiliation diagnostic system (ADS). So, let’s apply it here to the
overlooking phenomenon. We know already that overlooking is a case of
internal conflict. This conflict is mappable by the ADS, as that between
someone’s involuntary and voluntary affiliations. Unlike the cases described in
chapter 2, there is no consistency or un-specificity concerning affiliations for the
overlooker. Here we can see that overlookers disavow (even if they cannot
completely escape) their involuntary affiliation to whiteness and consciously
avow voluntary affiliations to out-groups and groups which acknowledge and
take as their aim issues of racial justice and awareness. In virtue of the privileged
norms of her birth, the overlooker is positioned to be racist and to incorporate
that standpoint in accidental ways. But, although she is likely to some extent
psychologically determined (her whiteness is inescapable), her choices of
affiliation are not, having chosen to voluntarily affiliate with groups and sets of
beliefs and values opposed to those forces. In thinking through this internal
conflict via the affiliation diagnostic, we have a clear picture of what makes it
possible that social-structural forces play out in individual psychology, namely
by diametrically opposed affiliations.
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3.2. Internal Regulation and Amelioration
Recall that unlike implicitly biased subjects, overlookers can regulate
(with autonomous System 2 control) their unintentional racism and are not
pervasively biased. But unlike IB, where someone else points it out and helps to
train it out, here the overlooker does it all by herself. So, we might wonder: if
overlooking involves unintentional/nonconscious actions, how will the
overlooker know how to lessen it? I am going to demonstrate how, by an
emotional response and introspection, overlookers can regulate their actions to
show that there is a new sort of amelioration to consider, another to add to the
running list from chapter 2. Regulation must come from somewhere; something
must make it happen, but because overlookers are not pervasively biased, IB and
AI are not going to cut it concerning regulation.
So, let’s consider the psychology, a step-by-step story of how the
overlooker might engage in such regulation. This is just a plausible story to
reveal another sort of amelioration not considered, to my knowledge, anywhere
else. Let’s call the following description introspective amelioration, which means
lessening overlooking by recognizing and regulating it. First, something might
feel “off” in the overlooker, an inkling that something is wrong, having
committed a racist act, but without knowing why she feels bad. She may have,
say, non-consciously registered a victim’s reaction. Perhaps she feels some
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shame, even if she does not yet know its cause.20 But if she is not aware of her
action (and her failure to regulate it), then why would she feel bad? Simply put,
we do not always have to be aware to have an emotional response.21 In any
event, she does not yet know what she did that is the cause of her shame. The
reasons for her unease are still nonconscious, just a vague sense that something
feels off. But if she is feeling off, then it is realistic to suppose that she is
motivated to figure out what is going on, because something is not squaring with
who she takes herself to be. Although there is no guarantee that she will be
motivated to unpack why she is feeling off, she is positioned to do so.22
Given her unease, she may try to remember what she did—the
overlooking action. Some part of her clearly registers her unease after the action.
So, she takes a memorial inventory and traces back her uneasiness to the
overlooking action: “I did do something wrong.” Now that she is aware of what
she did, she is enormously motivated to understand what her motives might
have been, but she is so convinced that “That’s not me” that she cannot imagine
any valid motivates for her overlooking action. But her unease will not go away,
so she may begin to think that some part of her is racist such that thinking
“That’s not me” no longer makes sense. At this point she is really confused. She

I will not detail the specific nature of shame here, but I have in mind something continuous
with its being caused by a loss of self-respect after failing to live up to one’s own commitments
(Rawls 1971, §67), and thinking less of oneself or a sense of guilt (Williams 1993, 93, 219-223).
21 If, à la Sullivan (2006), we can have unconscious habits, then why not nonconscious emotions?
If we grant the former, we can grant the latter.
22 Not all cases of overlooking acts, nor even necessarily the majority, are accessible to the
overlooker, but it is implausible that it is never accessible. All I need is one case where she can
register her act and the rest follows.
20
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does not recognize herself as the person who did the overlooking action. She
may think, “Maybe some part of me is racist.” “I don’t want to be that person.” It
dawns on her that something about herself she thought was true is not actually
true, and that she should be on the lookout for this sort of thing.23 Motivated by
the force of shame and by a greater sense of taking care of themselves and others,
overlookers will likely take personal responsibility for their unintentional racism
and lessen its frequency.
3.3. Moral Evasions
Finally, where we propose ideas such as in virtue of birth or in virtue of
totally uncontrollable nonconscious thought processing as the reasons why some
people are racist, it seems to imply that we cannot hold them to account for their
racism. “It’s those social forces.” “I was ambushed.” “It’s my brain automatically
going about its business.” “I can’t help it.” These are all examples of moral evasion
by which I mean escaping moral accountability by appealing to exculpatory conditions.
The point is that subjects captured by AI and IB may evade responsibility.
Whether by ignorance, deflecting blame to social-structural processes, or noting a
lack of control, subjects may have (or may take) a “way out”. This is a
consequence we may rightly be unwilling to accept.
AI models understand active ignorance as the original sin of racist actions
taken as a result of (white) ignorance. It is not that subjects know better and did

Although she is the kind of person who is likely to introspect on this, there is a possibility of
denial here, that she wants to hold onto her self-image, and thus perhaps some motivation not to
look inward at herself.
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otherwise, an action for which they would be straightforwardly personally
culpable, but that they (to some extent) chose to be ignorant in the first place—i.e.,
they are actively ignorant—for which they are culpable for all actions taken out of
ignorance. Yet the connection between the socially structured ignorance and the
personal responsibility of the ignorant individual—i.e., taking responsibility for
oneself and/or holding oneself to account—seems tenuous, in that we might
suppose that individuals could appeal to being caught up in vast forces beyond
their personal control.24 Conversely, we seem to be unable to hold to account
those who really do know better and still do racist things, such as the overlooker,
because they are merely lumped in with a mass of white ignorance. It is not that
individuals cannot be held to account for their participation in harmful
structures at all, but that faceless structures seem to both lessen personal
motivations to change (no matter what they do, they are still part of the structure
of whiteness) and taking responsibility (they are at fault in virtue of the structure
rather than their own actions).
Further, given that we plausibly assume that control is a necessary
condition for moral responsibility, then on models of IB we have another tenuous
situation, as a lack of conscious control is a feature of those views. By appealing
to not being in complete control of one’s actions and behaviors, a subject may

Whites, then, could be said to be instruments of the “structural will” in the sense that corporate
agents are instruments of a “corporate will” (as in French 1995). Where, in virtue of her
whiteness, someone follows the structural will, she acts within a structurally oppressive or unjust
system. The implication is that under these conditions subjects are not themselves responsible
when the supervening “script” goes, or is, wrong. They can effectively relinquish moral
responsibility, given that the structure sets into motion determinants of individuals’ agency.
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claim this as an excuse for evading responsibility. Subjects, then, may blame their
automatic biases or an insufficient IB training seminar, divorcing themselves
from any personal role or agency—“It’s not me, it’s my brain.”25 They are unable
to endorse their actions with any reasons à la System 2 regulation, and so those
actions fall outside their conscious control. So, given that implicit bias shortcircuits a subject’s control, she can evade moral responsibility for that action.
But notice that overlookers have no recourse to the foregoing evasions.
Most obviously, they cannot claim to be ignorant (active or otherwise). They are
not simply informed to some degree, but they knowingly (albeit unintentionally)
cause, or nearly cause, racist events. Neither can overlookers deflect blame away
from personal responsibility to social-structural forces, because (from 3.1.) these
forces operate from within in the mind. Finally, that the overlooker fails to enact
the knowledge and care she already has entails her capacity to do otherwise.
Overlooking includes both the capacity to do some action φ or do some other
action ψ instead, as well as the capacity to reflectively endorse some set of
reasons for some action. To fail in the enactment of knowledge reveals in the
overlooker that she has a chance to regulate her action in such a way as to align
with her value scheme. Given that overlookers can or would have done
otherwise, it cannot be claimed that they lack conscious control over their racist
actions.

There is a growing literature on the issue of IB and moral responsibility. For an anthologized
treatment of the issue see Brownstein and Saul (2016) (especially Part 1). Unpacking this issue is
beyond the scope of this chapter; I only wish to put pressure on what IB implies with regard to
responsibility.
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The ultimate point is that phenomena like overlooking show us that
personal responsibility is something to be on the lookout for, and that morally
evasive implications and tactics ought themselves be evaded. No matter how
much we know and care, we are not beyond racism, just like anyone else who
does not know and does not care (or those who are post-IB training who might
think they are done—“It’s those white people over there, not me”). This is true
even in a more personal way than what structuralists might suggest—that one is
just racist because of one’s participation in systems of racial oppression and
injustice. This latter point has a damaging effect on taking personal responsibility
for oneself, precisely because there seems to be no hope, and thus no motivation,
of ever escaping the system.
In that vein, the question overlooking raises as concerns responsibility is:
how does or how can one take personal responsibility for social-structural ills?
Thus, overlooking does not resolve any moral issues, but instead shows us
something about responsibility—that responsibility, like overlooking racism, is
neither just personal nor just social. If it is not just the individual responsible for
herself or the groups and structures in and from which she participates and
benefits, then where does responsibility live, where is it located? These questions
are answered in chapter 4, where we will continue walking a tightrope—as we
have done in this and the previous chapter—and show that we should not
privilege the personal over the social or vice versa, but instead re-frame the idea
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of responsibility itself in such a way that avoids thinking exclusively in terms of
either the personal or the social.
Conclusion
Let’s speak plainly and practically. Is it psychologically realistic to
suppose that self-shaming academics (and the “woke” crowd in general) walk
through life in a constant state of shame based on their oppressive racial status?
What seems more likely is that constant vigilance and utter self-shame are
psychologically unsustainable outlooks and states of mind. Phenomena like
white fragility, bad faith wokeness, and virtue-signaling all depend on not just
recognizing but psychologically living in a state of original sin. No one can
maintain that frame of mind at all times, and those who might maintain they do
are the very ones susceptible to overlooking their own racism. So, what we end
up with are folks who likely think of themselves (consciously or not) as not those
(racist) white people, a comforting if misguided sentiment they take to be a
truism of themselves. This implication is one we might rightly count dangerous.
One does not have to be Kim, that is, one need not be an expert on race
and racism. One can be minimally knowledgeable and minimally care. But the
problem is that if one buys into the sorts of assumptions that AI and IB lay out,
then one might end up a member of the bad faith woke virtue-singling crowd.
This creates, it seems to me, an artificial rift between the “in the know” and the
“not in the know”. The in the know white folks might just think they are not the
ones who fall within the scope of AI or IB; rather, it is the white folks who are not
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in the know. But is this how things really stand? The practical worry is that this
promotes “but not me” sort of thinking, that is, the sort of thinking that one has
arrived—that one knows better and cares, which is exactly the point overlooking
addresses. But also, in important ways, this takes ideas of racism down from
academia’s ivory towers precisely because no amount of theoretical learning is
sufficient to prevent racism in a real and personal way, not solely in virtue of one’s
abstract whiteness. It is very human to draw a divide between knowledgeable
whites who are devoted and “know better” versus the masses who do not know
better. Overlooking shows that this artificial division is split, the barrier between
academia and “everyone else” dissolved. Those who care and know better
sometimes occupy “the other side” of that divided line. You may have spent
some time on the other side. What is at stake here is just a matter of being
accountable as a fallible human, no different in kind than other humans who do
not have special theoretical knowledge. If people are to maintain unrealistic
outlooks, then proliferations of bias, ambush, fragility, and overlooking will
ensue; we may give up, because it seems so hopeless.
But in tandem with the utter impracticalities of the always-vigilant selfshamer approach, we arrive at a dangerous blindness, because no one has that
always-vigilant ability, and where we fail, the implication is that we are not at
fault. And if we cannot do this without impossible standards, then we get more
and more instances of the overlooking phenomenon. The first step towards
amelioration, and the performative function this chapter attempts to execute, is
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awareness of the overlooking phenomenon. No one in good faith can assume “I’m
all through with racism, because I know better; I care.” The ultimate point of this
chapter on overlooking is to care about it, to see it. Be on the lookout. Be vigilant.
But not so as to be perfect, but instead, in admitting imperfection, retaining better
control in one’s actions, and changing who one is. If we cannot take the first step
towards awareness, what results is likely to be an un-ameliorated proliferation of
overlooking and overlookers, not to mention actively ignorant and implicitly
biased persons. These are people you know. They might be you; they might be
me.
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Chapter 4
A Continuum View of Responsibility
Introduction
Philosophers of race often construe racism as a moral concept and apply
the conceptual vocabulary of ethics to the problem of racism. This chapter
attempts something different by reversing that order. It asks: what if we took issues
that arise in racism and see whether they can help us think more generally about ethics,
and its conceptual arsenal, as such?1 It answers in the affirmative and focuses on
responsibility. Thus, this chapter is a meta-ethical inquiry into the idea of
responsibility. What constitutes responsibility? What are its proper targets?
Where is it located?
The previous chapter presented excuses called moral evasions—escaping
accountability by appealing to exculpatory conditions. We saw that there might
be reasons that actively ignorant and implicitly biased people can evade
responsibility. There is privilege in the ability to do so. In effect, these people can
dictate the extent to which they are responsible. It would seem, then, that the
ability to evade is made possible by having the weight of privilege on one’s side.
There is real power involved here. But what is the relationship between power
and responsibility more generally?

This is different to understanding responsibility in terms of racism, in the same way we might
understand something in terms of gender roles in feminist philosophy or in terms of economic
relations in Marxist theory. Of course, we can use a critical methodology that interprets
responsibilities in light of unjust social structures and racism. But that is not what I will do.

1
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In all the literature on responsibility there is very little in the way of a
substantive view of power, aside from narrow senses of (metaphysical) “power”
as an agent’s ability to cause actions.2 What many responsibility theorists instead
analyze are the various nuances of individual and social responsibility. What
generally ensues is running in metaphysical circles, oscillating attempts at
offering the “right” view of agency meant to resolve whether individuals,
groups, or societies are the appropriate targets of responsibility for some
harm(s). But what if we weren’t forced to choose between these targets?
In chapter 3 we saw that social forces play out in individuals, that the
social and the individual are connected in the overlooker’s mind. Here we
consider how power relations instantiate in groups composed of individuals.
Thus, whereas for the overlooker the nexus of the individual and the social is the
mind, here power is the nexus. So, this chapter will show that re-framing
responsibility by reference to power avoids the metaphysical oscillations noted
above—power does not force us to choose.
But beyond avoiding the complications of the individual and the social,
focusing on power has real practical purchase. We should want to go beyond
saying we’re only responsible just for the things we do. By re-framing
responsibility in terms of power, we can say that we’re responsible for more than
just what we do, but also that some are much more responsible than others. This

To my knowledge only Young (2006), McKenna (2018), Mackenzie (2018), and Oshana (2018)
focus on non-narrow, non-metaphysical senses of power. All generally have in common the idea
that responsibility is contoured by power dynamics that emerge from unjust structures of racial,
gender, and/or ethnic oppression. To reiterate, that is not my approach here. (See note 1.)
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might get people to actually take responsibility. So, I offer a notion of
responsibility that is tethered to the ground, that has practical consequences. It is
a notion that acknowledges that while not all may enjoy equal power in all
aspects of life, that shouldn’t disincentivize them to reject the notion that they
bear some responsibility.
1. Surveying Options
This section critically appraises three general positions on responsibility in
the literature: individual, collective, and shared. It highlights virtues of each
position but also presents what I am calling “complications” each runs up
against. These complications are the result of how each position metaphysically
frames agency, which comes in tow with theoretical and practical problems we
may rightly want to avoid. I argue that there are good reasons to re-frame the
conversation about responsibility to something beyond the focus on individuals,
collectives, and aggregated members of groups. This motivates locating
responsibility on a continuum, a view which avoids these consequences, and
adds some nuance of its own to the conversation.
1.1. The Individual
Let’s look at individualist views. We will look through both a
metaphysical lens (what it means to be a responsible “agent”) and a moral lens
(what it means to be held accountable). Both senses, of course, look at individual
persons. The focus on individual persons is what I am portraying as common
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amongst these views, as I cannot exhaustively present the variety of existing
positions and all their nuances.
Identity, Action, Morality
Let’s start with the metaphysical lens first. To be responsible is a question
about the composition of a moral agent, that which makes her a viable candidate
for responsible agency: e.g., that she has a will, that she can author her own
intentions and actions, and so on.3 This is about the identity of an agent qua
agent; one is responsible in virtue of her action’s being attributable to her. She is
the “author” of that action, where “authorship” is intentionality: her
motivational desires and her freedom to do otherwise. So, she is responsible
where her actions and behaviors are directed of her own volition (Frankfurt 1971;
Wolf 1987, 1990; Watson 1996, 234; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Smith 2005, 251252; 2008, 370; Sripada 2016, 1211, 1216). That she is the author of her actions is
what makes her a responsible agent.
Now that we know why an individual can be responsible at all, we can
speak to why she can be held responsible. Here the focus on individual
responsibility centers on what responsibility for something means morally
and/or politically—e.g., violating some duty to act (“prospective” responsibility)
or having violated some duty for an action that already happened
(“retrospective” responsibility).4 Though individualistically centered, the

To be clear, the question here is not about whether someone is responsible because it is good for
her (an egoism of some sort), but rather, whether she stands as someone who could be
responsible at all.
4 I am drawing this “prospective/retrospective” distinction from Zimmerman (2015).
3
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position acknowledges someone’s membership in a moral/political community.
One’s actions sometimes affect others. Someone can be held responsible for her
actions based on, for example, others’ “reactive attitudes” (Strawson 1974), our
failure to “comply” with the duties of our “social setting” (Watson 1996, 229), a
violation of contractarian duties (Scanlon 1998), or our actions’ negative
outcomes (Smart 1961, 1973). So, if the moral community of which I am a
member values promise-keeping and thinks it a duty to keep promises, then my
breaking a promise is a moral violation. Thus, others can hold me responsible.
A Virtue, a Complication, an Implication
A virtue of these views is that they are explanatorily compelling. What
would it mean to act without assuming a will, desires, or beliefs? How could we
assign moral status to actions without these? Where S did action A, it came from
S’s will, and so S is the one who is held to account and no one else. But if S did
not do A, if she did not will A to be so, then S is not at fault.5 Meeting certain
duties not to harm others is useful for determining whether an agent is
responsible for what has been done or what she failed to do. Unless we want to
do without ever holding persons to account, some basic notion of how and why
persons are accountable is indispensable.
But while features of personal responsibility are indispensable, the
position runs into complications where structural harms and injustices are
concerned. Call this the structural complication, by which I mean structural harms

5

Obvious hedges notwithstanding—e.g., genuine actions of omission.
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likely cannot be tied to individual actors. I did not author, intend or directly
cause a structural injustice or its harmful outcomes, nor did I set these social
processes into motion—e.g., world poverty, environmental harm, educational
inequalities, unequal access to healthcare, and so on. It does not seem likely that
we can link those structural harms to specific, singular individuals. If we hold
that these are morally significant states of affairs, yet no one individual can be
blamed for them, then individualism fails to offer a sufficient notion of
responsibility.
Individualism, further, runs an implied risk that individuals may simply
deny or ignore their potentially complicit roles in maintaining structural harms, in
that one can plausibly deny one’s intentional role in perpetuating structural
harms. This lets individuals off the moral hook. So, something more is necessary
beyond a view of individual moral agency.
1.2. The Social
Perhaps the structural complication and its implication are avoidable by
focusing instead on groups. If one of us isn’t responsible, maybe we all are. So,
let’s turn to positions on social responsibility: collective and shared responsibility. I
use “social responsibility” to capture these positions, because each depends on
there being at least two (or more) individuals. The point of contention between
the two is whether or not responsibility is distributed to all members of the
group, where “distribution” means doling out responsibility to individuals who
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populate the group. Collective responsibility does not always assume so and
shared responsibility does. Let’s turn to collective responsibility first.
Collective Responsibility and (Usually) Non-Distribution
Genocide, environmental harm, unequal educational opportunities,
disproportionate access to healthcare, and so on, are not outcomes that are neatly
ascribable to individual agents. But we might rightly want to ascribe
responsibility to something for these issues. Here is where collective responsibility
helps. As before, I will not encyclopedically overview collective responsibility.
Instead, I just want to point to what its views have in common: a holistic, nonindividualistic approach. The idea is that unified wholes (“collectives”) can be
held responsible (usually) without distributing responsibility to individual
members of that unified whole.
For example, it is the car company that is responsible for an
environmental harm, and not necessarily all its individual corporate agents. Or it
is the nation that is responsible for genocidal acts, unequal educational
opportunities, or disproportionate access to healthcare. The reason is that
collectives are cohesive, organized groups which undertake collective actions,
where the group itself is an “agent” distinct from its members (French 1979, 1984,
Chs. 3 and 4, 1998, 37; Corlett 2001, 575; Mathiesen 2006; List and Pettit 2011).
Consider Peter French’s (1984) view of corporate agency: corporations are moral
agents because they act intentionally, have the capacity for rational decisionmaking, and can respond to reasons (ibid, Ch. 3). A group, whether a company
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or a nation, has a decision structure that can be enacted despite its individual
members. If a group, as a whole, can respond to reasons and collectively act, it is
not so counterintuitive to suppose it can be held responsible as a whole.
But here is where the question of distribution arrives, causing things to get
murky. While some theorists think collective responsibility is not dissolvable to
individual actors of a collective (Arendt 1987) or unanalyzable in terms of
individual responsibility (Issacs 2006, 2014), others find room for responsibility
of at least a few individual actors of a collective (French 1998, 25; Mathiesen 2006;
Mellema 2006). So, collective responsibility is generally non-distributive, but not
always non-distributive. A corporation may be responsible for some past harm at
time1, but perhaps no current members are individually responsible because its
employees have been entirely replaced at timen+1. But where a nation commits
genocide, we might rightly want to say that some individuals (perhaps some
leaders) are at fault, while others may be absolved of responsibility.
A Virtue, a Complication, an Implication
Two virtues of collective responsibility are its explanatory power and its
praxis. The former can show why a complex phenomenon can be unified or
reduced by understanding it in terms of something simpler. So, collective
responsibility is powerful in this sense because we do not have to search through
the messiness of individual intentions or agents. Instead, we cut through the
details to hit the basic principle (membership in the collective), that which all the
individuals have in common, by which we then assign responsibility. But
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collective responsibility is also practical: it allows a principled basis on which we
can argue that whole groups should, for example, make good on social programs
such as reparations and affirmative action, things we might find practically
desirable to do.
Yet, collective responsibility runs up against a distributive complication. The
position slides between distributing responsibility to individuals and not. There
is something of a dilemma here. On the one hand, where we don’t distribute
responsibility to individuals, we run the risk of absolving them, good and bad, of
responsibility whether they directly participated in the collective’s harms or not.
While this is sometimes a virtue of the position (completely innocent persons are
faultless), it lets off the hook those who may have directly contributed to the
collective’s harms. On the other hand, where one does distribute responsibility to
certain members of the group, we might for example both maintain the nation’s
responsibility for genocide and distribute some responsibility to the organizers
and killers. But where does the distribution stop? Is it enough to single out some
token actors from the collective whole?6 But if we name individuals, we lose
explanatory power, the virtue of not having to sort through the details of every
case, the broader context, and the intentions of individuals. These are the sorts of
things we were not supposed to have to worry about in the first place.

It may be worth wondering, also, whether the view reduces to personal responsibility if we
slide all the way down the distributive slippery slope. It also seems likely that drawing a line in
the sand would raise difficulties about borderline cases: who is “just enough” responsible and
who isn’t?

6
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A further complication is a practical motivational disincentive. If all are
absolved or (if we do not know where to draw the distributive line) not all are
absolved, then many (all?) will not feel personally responsible. And feelings
matter, because then individuals will not take responsibility—i.e., they will not
change their harmful ways. Individuals might think they do not “own” any
responsibility—it’s owned by the collective. The problem is reminiscent of moral
evasiveness (as discussed vis-à-vis active ignorance in chapter 3), because
individuals have a ground from which they can point their fingers to society
instead of themselves, effectively turning away from the harms their society
causes. Whether it is genocide, a car company, or the structural problems of a
nation, it is not farfetched to suppose individuals will look anywhere but to
themselves. Just as in chapter 2 where we noted the role of the philosopher as a
functionary of humanity, and that public reaction matters vis-à-vis one’s
theoretical and practical goals, here we have a similar issue. When we have a
notion of responsibility that is so disconnected from individuals’ personal
responsibility, no one will feel any direct ownership of the collective’s actions.
Why care when it is the car company or nation that is at fault?
Shared Responsibility and Distribution
If we want to avoid the foregoing complications, yet retain some emphasis
on groups, then we will have to look elsewhere. Notions of shared responsibility
connect responsibility to individual members constitutive of a group, which
(unlike collective notions) is not necessarily a cohesive or organized group that
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acted together to cause some harmful event.7 So, whereas collective
responsibility is non-individualistic, shared responsibility is individualistic.8 And
whereas collective responsibility is generally non-distributive, shared
responsibility is always distributive.9
As before, consider the general features of the view: a methodological
individualism. Moral agency is attributable only to individuals in a group, not
the group qua group. So, where A is some group action, A is only a group action
insofar as it was undertaken together by individuals in that group. Each member
of the group is, then, responsible for A. Think of a conspiracy to commit murder.
It is not just the individual who did the murderous act who is responsible, but
rather that the responsibility is “distributed” to all those who participated in that
group. Whereas collective responsibility is not generally connected to individual
members of a group, shared responsibility is. So perhaps shared responsibility
can recapture that lost explanatory appeal of the personal without its antistructural drawbacks, and retain the social focus of the collective without its
impractical results.
On shared agency, groups “have” agency because their individual members
share the same sorts of intentions or attitudes and act together accordingly, not
despite their individual members’ intentions or attitudes. Shared agency is

See May (1992, 106-107).
Though it connects responsibility to a group’s individuals, it is not synonymous with individual
responsibility (as presented above) because, as noted, it depends on the existence of at least two
or more individuals whereas individual responsibility need only depend on one.
9 See Feinberg (1968, 647), May (1992, 37-38), and Issacs (2006, 61; 2014, 43).
7
8
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captured in a few different ways. Sometimes it is captured by a cultural “climate
of attitudes” motivating persons to act (May 1992, 46, 53-54). There is certainly
such a climate in the conspiracy case, that each contributes towards a positive
attitude towards the murder. It could also be construed in terms of shared
intentions, that where a and b intend to do A, a and b are responsible for A.
(Bratman 1999, 121; 2014, 103). There was a shared intention to murder because
the parties all intend the same action. Or it can be seen as dependent on being
“socialized as a member” of a group (Silver 2002, 299-301). This means that
whether we like it or not “we cannot choose to stop viewing ourselves as
members” of a group (294). Each member of the group, having been socialized as
a member, shares in that group’s murderous identity, and has ownership over its
actions. Identity as “shared” by group members may also ground shared “duties
to respond” (Radzik 2001, 466). In our toy example, this may involve the
normative peer pressure to not back out or to not prevent the murder from
happening.
Suppose we take May’s (1992) “climate of attitudes” approach. Attitudes
cause a “climate” that can make it such that certain kinds of harm are likely to
occur in some community (46). For instance, a climate of COVID-19 vaccination
wariness may result in the deaths of others (and/or oneself). Each individual
who shares the intention not to vaccinate shares also the harmful results of
abstention. Such a “climate of attitudes” motivates shared action, where each
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member at least partially plays a role in contributing to the wrongs resulting
from the action.
If shared agency is granted, then members of a group act together
(directly or indirectly) to bring about some harm or fail to prevent it. Thus, each
of those members shares in the responsibility for that harm (Zimmerman 1985;
May 1992, Ch. 8; Sadler 2006; Young 2004, 2006, 2011; Darby and Branscombe
2014). That is, unlike collective views, here responsibility is distributed to
individuals in the group. Though some think responsibility should not be
distributed in equal measure (May 1992, 10-11, 38-42; Young 2006, 125; 2004, 381,
383-388), others argue that it should (Zimmerman 1985, 115). Despite this
disagreement, the overarching point is that all agree that each member of a
group is responsible for the outcomes of a harmful shared action, whether they
contributed directly or indirectly to those outcomes. So, while not all of the
conspirators participated in the physical murderous act, each bears responsibility
for the harmful outcome, having played a role in planning the act. Similarly,
members of the anti-vaccination community each bear responsibility for the
harmful outcomes of abstaining from getting vaccinated.
A Virtue, a Complication, an Implication
A virtue of shared responsibility is that it is integrative, by which I mean it
captures why we have reason to think individuals, interconnectedly constitutive
of groups, are each responsible for harms caused by the group. No one is let off
the hook for group wrongs, which avoids the implied denial of collective
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responsibility. And the position provides a useful tool for unpacking the nuances
of broader cases like structural harms. Suppose members of a governing body
pass legislation whose outcome is disproportionate access to healthcare for some
citizens. It seems clear enough that those members each share responsibility for
this outcome. But what of those who voted for those lawmakers? Here the
participation in passing legislation is not overt, but it is still contributory, because
those lawmakers would not have their positions were it not for their voters.
Shared responsibility provides a groundwork by which to distribute
accountability to each person involved in the harm regardless of whether their
role is direct.
But although the view lets no one off the hook, it faces a participation
complication, by which I mean two things. First, shared agency, on which the
position depends, cannot account for what we can call epistemically isolated cases,
that is, cases where agents know nothing of committed harms, which may be
cases of genuine ignorance. Second, shared agency cannot account for those who
cannot participate in taking up responsibility to prevent harms. This in turn
implies an excessive rigor, that distributing responsibility to each member of a
group may be unfairly burdensome.
For instance, consider an isolated Hutu Rwandan farmer. He tends to his
goats, plays no role in the Hutu regime, and knows nothing of the harmful
events it caused. On the foregoing view, although the farmer is not involved in
any Hutu genocide, he still shares (partially) in the responsibility for those
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harms—perhaps not because he did nothing at all, but because he did nothing to
prevent any of those harms. This seems to offend against fairness, because he
does not contribute in any relevant sense to the harms committed by the Hutu
regime.
But there is a second sense where participation is likely not possible at all.
If global issues such as environmental harm are something for which we ought to
together share responsibility, then it would seem that taking up the torch might
be available to only a select sub-set of a population—i.e., participating is not a
live option for everyone. Those who cannot afford an electric car or must buy
plastic bottled water due to unpotable water in their community, cannot share in
responsibility for preventing environmental damage. Are they at fault? The point
is that shared responsibility seems to imply unfair and, in some cases, tone-deaf
burdens.
2. Responsibility on a Continuum
This section aims to avoid the foregoing consequences by locating
responsibility on a continuum of power. Very simply, the more power we have,
the greater our responsibility. I arrive at this view by thinking through a series of
continuums, and what they imply, relating to harm, power, and agency. Along
the way I will show the superiority of this view by showing how it avoids the
imbroglios of the literature’s camps. Now, to be clear, I am not going to offer any
hard-and-fast rule why or that someone or something is responsible; no
normative theory of responsibility will be offered below, and I’ll say nothing of
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moral blame. Rather, I am considering a different way to think about
responsibility, a different way to frame an ethically relevant word.
2.1. Continuum I: Harm
Let’s begin by distinguishing two senses of responsibility. Suppose I’m
waxing cars at a car wash. I’m causally responsible for the wax job because my
actions caused it. Now, I didn’t have much choice in the matter if I was told by
middle management to use a particular car wax brand. So, though I’m causally
responsible for the wax job, I didn’t have much of any choice to use that
particular brand.10 Now suppose the car wax is defective and ruins the paintjob
of the cars to which it is applied. I’ve caused a harmful effect, not in the odd
sense that the paintjobs are “harmed”, but that the customers are harmed.
But what is a harm?11 While I will not offer any novel definition of
“harm”, I take loose inspiration from Joel Feinberg’s (1984, Ch. 2) nonnormative
notion that harm is a “setback to interests.”12 Let’s unpack this. A setback to
interests is a consequence of something—i.e., it is an effect. But this does not
happen in a void—it happens to someone or some group. And what “happens”

The question of “degrees” of agency will be elaborated in the next section. Here I’m only
attempting to begin with a plausible case that degrees of harm matter where responsibility is
concerned.
11 The reader will find in a moment that I borrow from Feinberg (1984). But my thinking is
continuous with Bradley’s (2012) desideratum that an account of harm should not assume that
harm is always morally wrong (395). Following Hanser (2008, 421), I think that harm is morally
significant, though I do not begin there.
12 Harm as a setback to interests relies, for Feinberg, on a so-called “counterfactual” account of
harm, according to which where S is harmed, S is in a position where her interests are set back in
a way they otherwise would not have been. See Feinberg (1986). See also Thomson (2011, 447450) for another version of a counterfactual view. I will not spend time here defending that
account. See Klocksiem (2012) for a defense.
10
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is that their autonomy is negatively affected. For now, “autonomy” just means the
capacity to make an informed choice to act on an option from some set of options
without any undue external influence. Moving forward, harm will include a
notion of autonomy, namely that it was negatively affected.
So, let’s say that a harm is, prima facie, some effect that is attributable to the
causal capacity of an agent or agents, where that effect has potential negative
consequences for individuals or groups. I do not mean at the moment anything
explicitly moral about harm, though of course this is not to deny that harm has
moral implications. It would seem that some setbacks are greater than others,
that harm is delineable by degree. So, we might further develop ideas about
degrees of harm involved on a continuum running along two axes: severity and
quantity. The former has to do with how harmed someone or some group is. The
latter has to do with how many are harmed. What I will attempt is to make a
plausible case, by example, that harm exists on a continuum.
Let’s explore this further by marking off different degrees of harm by
severity. How harmed are individuals or groups, that is, how much has their
agency been affected? Consider the following examples.
GLUTTONOUS TODDLER.

I prevent a toddler from eating three pounds of ice

cream in one sitting.
VIOLENT CRIME.

I commit premeditated murder against a completely

innocent person.
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DISCLOSURE.

A company does not disclose information about their

product, preventing consumers from making fully informed purchases.
SYSTEMIC.

A region practices redlining, encourages gentrification, and sets

de facto limits on equal access to healthcare, all of which
disproportionately affect a sub-set of the population.
Though my preventing the gluttonous toddler from eating three pounds of ice
cream in one sitting may be a setback in some minimal sense, it seems she is not
very harmed (if at all).13 There must be some reasonable construal of autonomy
where harms are concerned. It is not unreasonable for me to prevent the toddler
from eating that much ice cream, because she lacks the autonomy to make an
informed choice. But it is unreasonable of me to commit a physically violent
crime against a completely innocent person because it is a clear-cut case of totally
extinguishing someone’s autonomy. The company’s failure to disclose
information about their product is another unreasonable denial of autonomy
because consumers were prevented from making a fully informed choice about
their purchase. Here the harm is less severe than being a victim of a violent
crime, but more severe than the toddler example, because the former eliminates
autonomy, and the latter reasonably limits it. The systemic setbacks
unreasonably limit autonomy because they unfairly restrict opportunities,
choices, and the basic needs and interests of a whole swath of individuals. Here
is a harm still less severe than the total elimination of autonomy but perhaps

13

Some form of paternalism is likely justified in such a scenario.
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more severe than the consumer example, as the range of setbacks is far broader
than the “choice” of purchasing a singular product.
Let’s now explore different quantitative degrees of harm. How many are
harmed? Before doing so, however, I want to make it clear that I am not
suggesting that the greater number of persons who are harmed means that the
harm is therefore more severe, that quantity always directly correlates with
severity. As I am not offering an explicitly moral analysis of harm, the reader
should not assume any consequentialist calculus, rather we are only after how
harm is measurable along two dimensions.
Now, we have already seen an example of one person being harmed: the
victim of a violent crime. But the other two examples broaden harm’s numerical
scope. So, let’s consider some more examples to further substantiate the harm
continuum in terms of quantity.
VEHICLE.

Purchasers of a vehicle only sold in the U.S. are harmed because

it was manufactured using an unreliable transmission that was selected by
higher-ups because it was a cost-effective option.
SHOES.

A shoe manufacturer employs sweatshop laborers to mass-produce

its footwear.
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LAW.

In 1973 the United States Supreme Court decided in the case of San

Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez14 that it is not
unconstitutional to fund public schools based on local property taxes.15
In VEHICLE, the quantitative scope is restricted in at least two ways: to the U.S.
and to only those who purchased the vehicle. This is a case of direct harm to a
group of faceless consumers, smaller in scope to the examples of LAW and SHOES,
but many are nevertheless harmed. SHOES is similar in scope to LAW, where great
numbers of persons are harmed—i.e., sometimes harm is society-wide, baked, as
it were, into social structures. In LAW, the result is that equal funding among
public schools in the region was not equally distributed, leaving schools in
poorer districts significantly underfunded and their students deprived and
disadvantaged in comparison to schools in wealthier areas. It amounted to
indirectly calcifying a structural harm, affecting many disproportionately.16
To my knowledge, all three positions on responsibility from section 1 take
harm for granted as an assumed component of a theory of responsibility. Even
where we hedge by saying that some may not be equally responsible for some
harm, it is not at all clear why, against the backdrop of harm, this is so. Perhaps
because the debates are so metaphysically-framed (what makes for a moral
agent, what a collective is and how it is an agent, and how shared agency works)

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
That is, it was decided that it was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause.
16 I say “indirectly” because the Justices may not have “created” the structural harm, but rather,
solidified it.
14
15
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that they end up presuming some of the necessary essentials without much
description. But harm is not an amorphous phenomenon to be simply assumed.
If harm is taken for granted, not only do we miss out on its nuances, but we also
run the risk of unfairly allocating it.
The importance of offering a harm continuum is precisely that it adds
some sophistication to our understanding of responsibility. That we can
appreciate that not all harms are the same, that some are more severe than others
and some affect greater numbers than others, gives us greater purchase in
knowing how responsible individuals or groups are. We might say we are more
responsible for harms with greater severity, or that we bear a greater
responsibility for preventing a large quantity of harm. But given that harm has
been tied to agency, as an effect that we cause, we might rightly wonder whether
degrees of harm correlate to degrees of agency, whether the capacity to cause
greater or lesser harms has something to do with the “amount” of agency we
have. This is a question to which we turn next.
2.2. Continuum II: Power and Agency
If the harm continuum is granted, then how can it be caused to greater or
lesser extents? Let’s garner some insight from José Medina’s (2013) notion of
responsible agency which emphasizes an oppressor/oppressed relationship. For
Medina, mitigating systemic injustices requires that oppressors, or those with
disproportionate power (i.e., privilege), know the ways they are socially
positioned in relation to those injustices (133). Beyond oppressive systems of
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racial or gender injustice, is there something more general to say about
responsibility as such borne out by Medina’s insight? The proportionality of
power found in the oppressor/oppressed relationship helps us to think about
responsibility in general—there is something special about our responsibilities
given the sorts of persons we are. A continuum of power and proportionality has
to do with how privileged status—i.e., how much power we have—corresponds
to the effects we can propagate.
Having power over others can lead to harms as negative outcomes, so let’s
first consider why the more power we have, the more agency we have. By “power” I
mean the greater or lesser extent to which we17 can change something or effect
some result, results that have implications for other individuals.18 So, for
instance, power can be as minimal as my preventing a toddler from eating three
pounds of ice cream in one sitting, and as maximal as a CEO’s decision to put
that brand of sparkplug into the engines on the assembly line or a nation’s
decision to go to war. The point is that power comes in degrees based on its
range of causality and effects. The nation going to war has a tremendous capacity

I use the first-person plural pronoun “we” here instead of “individual”, “group”, “collective”,
or “aggregate” not just for simplicity’s sake, but also because I want the scope of power to be
broad. So “we” could be a person, a group, a group within a group, a collective, a nation, and so
on. Thus, we can speak of an individuals’ power within a group, a group’s power as a whole, or
the power of sub-groups within a group (e.g., a board of directors, who within a larger group
have more power than others in that group).
18 My notion of power, then, is different to “getting what one wants” (Goldman 1972, 222-223;
Hobbes 1994, Pt. 1, Ch. 10). Nor does it have to do with doing what one wants in the face of
resistance (Weber 2013). Because I will, below, claim that power is a property of agents, my
notion is contrary to Arendt’s (1972) who thinks that “power is never the property of an
individual; it belongs to a group…” (143). And I do not quite mean by “power” what Foucault
(1978, 1980) means—i.e., I do not mean it as operating in a matrix of truth, knowledge, and ethics.
But my view is continuous with Russell’s (1996) notion of power as the “production of intended
effects” (23).
17
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to cause effects, choosing to mobilize troops and affect the regions wherein they
fight. The CEO’s sparkplug decision affects all cars manufactured in the plant.
The assembly line worker’s power is much lower than that of the CEO’s. She
does not choose which sparkplugs to put into the engines; she only puts them in.
Now, the kind of power we have, and its degree, is only possible under
certain conditions. The exercise of power is contextual to the group in which it is
exercised. For instance, Supreme Court Justices have a lot of power in the context
of jurisprudence, the CEO over a car company, the governing body of a nation
over its citizens, and so on. Thus, it is in virtue of our affiliation with a specific
group that we have the kind of power we have. People with power within those
groups achieve what they achieve within contexts. Responsibility qua groups
must, then, include some notion of the relative power of the individuals
involved: a continuum of power.
Harms (effects) are caused by agents. Power is a property of agents. It
depends on agency for its exercise. I mean by “agency” a stronger notion of
autonomy. It is (1) synchronic: one’s narrow ability to cause any single action or
event. And it is (2) diachronic: an ability to cause a series of actions or events.
Where agency is synchronic, it involves at some time slice my ability to cause an
event in any one choice set, a range of choices one of which we do. Where agency
is diachronic, it involves a series of choices made over time, instrumental steps
each of which we have synchronic control over—choices we have to cause
actions or events. One is an agent on this construal where one can act according
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to her own principle in free self-determination.19 Negatively put, it is the capacity
to cause our own actions without undue external influence.20
Permit me to elaborate further. Agency is the ability to cause a range of
effects in any one instance of a possible event scenario.21 And if I have a high
degree of autonomy, I can narrowly choose, for example, to go to the health
foods store to purchase groceries or to McDonald’s. I choose one or the other and
then cause the event to happen by doing one or the other. More widely, I can
instantiate my values about a healthy lifestyle over a series of health-conscious
choices where I have the money (autonomy) to go to a gym, shop at Whole
Foods, see a nutritionist and so on. For any one choice, narrowly, I might have a
greater range of options, and for a series of choices, widely, I can instantiate a
greater range of options in my series of choices over time. An agent may have a
greater or lesser degree of autonomy, which instantiates both choice features.
While both agency and power have to do with the capacity to generate an
effect, power is relational—exerting influence over others22—whereas agency
implies control over oneself, and not necessarily others. That we are in control

Though my sense of autonomy is far less rigorous than that of Frankfurt (1971), it is continuous
with his view that in acting autonomously our first-order desires are motivated by our secondorder desires. If we identify with our second-order desires, we can be said to be “acting freely” à
la Dworkin (1970).
20 This is of course continuous with Berlin’s (2002) ideas about positive and negative liberty.
21 I am drawing here on Davidson’s (2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d) philosophy of action, as well as
Vargas’s (2013, 246-249) notion of “moral ecology”, according to which agency is shaped by the
“social terrain” in which agents act, that one’s social identity and position can affect how and
whether we can act.
22 This notion is continuous with Russell (1996, 24), and to some extent with Lukes (2005) where
he claims, “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (27).
However, where Lukes wants to avoid paternalism, I do not wish to dismiss it outright, as
illustrated by GLUTTONOUS TODDLER.
19
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over our own actions is different to how our actions affect others. One might
construct a matrix, from low to high agency on the x-axis, and low to high power
on the y-axis. Those with a high degree of agency likely have some power (not
“low”), though one might imagine Thoreau at Walden Pond, or an ascetic
completely withdrawn from society, controlling his own life very well but
without affecting anyone else, and so falling rather low on the y-axis. Those
scoring high on both axes (“high” power and “high” agency) might include our
Supreme Court Justices from above, but perhaps others too, such as Jeff Bezos
and Bill Gates. And within the context of the factory floor, the assembly line
worker likely fits into the low power/low agency corner of our matrix, fitting the
sparkplugs to the engine over and over again. But now we arrive at the
important square of the matrix, those with little agency and a high degree of power.
The unlikeliness of this scenario indicates that it is likely that agency is a
necessary though insufficient condition for power. How could one who cannot
author her own actions also control others? For instance, we might imagine
Plato’s unwilling tyrant who has a great deal of power but no agency. Such an
example of someone with a lot of power but no agency is fairly absurd, because
agency is required to exercise power at all.
Where we have a great degree of power over how others are affected, we
will also have a high degree of agency with regard to our own choices. We
would not be able to cause effects that harm others if we ourselves were not in
charge of our own decisions. Agency matters because it brings out the notion of a
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free choice, a reasonable prerequisite of responsibility, where people are
responsible for their exercise of power. So, just as we might say that a
punishment should be proportional to the committed crime, we can similarly say
that agency is proportional to degree of power. Who or what you are matters.23
Have I relied on the dichotomy of individuals and groups in any
substantive way? Where the literature’s views on agency center on the
metaphysical difficulties of the mereology of agency, they seem to run into
strange artifacts. Reframing agency in terms of the power/agency continuum
avoids these artifacts because it allows for gradients within a group, borne out by
degrees of power, of what we have control over. Those who don’t have any
reasonable control over a situation cannot be said to have caused that situation,
in which case we allow individuals within a group that are merely agentially
epiphenomenal constituents. Their membership is causally inert to the
outcome.24 While we might suppose this has anti-structural consequences, it
need not be so. It is simply that those who have very little power relative to other
members of the group also have, relatively, less agency to cause the outcomes.
Hence, one might reasonably suppose that an impoverished white person still
has some unfair autonomy (in virtue of white privilege) not enjoyed by other

There is broad application here from CEOs, boards of directors, nations, racial groups (whites
and BIPOC), castes and classes, to assembly line workers and more.
24 As with any gradient, there are near-limit cases. A person may have such a small degree of
agency within a group that she has, functionally, no real agency at all. The factory worker could
quit her job, but that may be the only economic option for her, and we could suppose feeding her
family is also a reasonable responsibility. I’m agnostic about where that point is for everyone and
anyone—but the contextualized nature of power and agency by affiliation to some group may
provide an inroad to its location within the group.
23
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races, yet very little autonomy in other situations (e.g., she is a factory worker
who installs the faulty sparkplug). Harm, agency, and power are contextual and
gradient, which is simply a more accurate way of understanding causality than
the individual/group notions of agency and their thin notions of harm.
2.3. Continuum III: Responsibility
So far, we have said that harm, power, and agency exist on continuums.
We have said also that power requires agency. But having a greater or lesser
degree of agency does not mean much on its own unless it is put to use. That we
can do something does not mean that we will or must do something. But when
we do put our agency to use, the continuums interactively come into play:
(1) the more power we have, the more agency we have, and
(2) the more agency we have, the greater our ability to propagate effects.
Now, let’s specify “effects” as harms. The degree of harm we can propagate is
proportional to the degree of agency we have. So, given (1) and (2):
(3) the more power we have, the greater our ability to propagate harms.
That we can propagate harms justifies the move, then, to a discussion of
responsibility, because we can be held responsible for the harms we cause. The lower
we fall on a continuum of power, the less capacity we have to propagate harm,
and the higher we fall on a continuum of power, the greater our capacity is to
propagate harm. So, if we grant continuums I and II, we uncover that the degree
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to which we are responsible corresponds to where we fall on a continuum of
power.25
Let’s elaborate by returning to some abovementioned examples. In
VEHICLE,

for instance, the assembly line worker played a role in causing some

harm, but it is disproportionate in relation to those who made the decisions to
use the unreliable transmission, as the worker simply installed it. So, the
worker’s ability to harm is of a lower degree because she has a lower degree of
power over what is done, whereas higher-ups’ ability to harm is far greater,
because they have a higher degree of power over what is done. In the case of
SHOES,

the shoe company exploitatively harms swaths of laborers. Though shoe-

purchasers did not directly create the conditions in which the use of sweatshops
was decided on, they play a role in perpetuating those conditions, and so also
cause harm. So, consumers fall somewhere lower on the continuum as opposed
to those who authored the decision to use sweatshops, given that they have the
power to perpetuate the conditions where sweatshop labor is “justified” but did
not themselves decide to set those conditions in motion. So, although consumers
have a certain degree of power, they nevertheless harm to a lesser degree than
those who made the ultimate decisions. Finally, and straightforwardly, in the

Feinberg (1968) and Mellema (2006) have hinted at the notion of degrees of responsibility. The
former by emphasizing “complicity” and “vicarious” action (675-685). The latter by emphasizing
“qualifying actions”. Neither focuses on power proper.

25
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case of LAW, the Supreme Court Justices have an immense capacity to propagate
harm, namely on the poor communities of San Antonio and beyond.26
The degree to which we can propagate harms corresponds to the degree to
which we are responsible for those harms. So:
(4) the greater our ability to propagate harms, the greater our
responsibility.
Thus, we arrive at the continuum view of responsibility. Given (1), (2), and (4):
(5) the more power we have, the greater our responsibility.
Harm is about the quantity of negative consequences and their severity. How
many are harmed and how harmed are they, and how does that harm correlate
to our power? The paper mill officials who decide that toxic waste should be
dumped into a river seem to warrant a far greater degree of responsibility given
its impact on those who live by and depend on the river (not to mention the local
ecosystem) than do the low-level employees who press the pulp and roll the
sheets. The point is that the continuum of harm propagation meets a continuum
of responsibility, both of which involve varying degrees of power.
Let’s consider some implications of the more sophisticated notion of
responsibility. Structurally, there are those within the advantaged group that
bear more responsibility for structurally problematic outcomes. The Supreme
Court of 1972 bears more responsibility for structural harm than perhaps any

See, for instance, Sutton (2012). It may also be worth wondering that an impact is not just
agentially captured—i.e., what we cause—but that it is also temporally captured—i.e., the effects of
what we cause over time.
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other discretely nameable group of individuals. It is not that we just eliminate
the idea of group responsibility for structural outcomes, but that within certain
groups some are clearly more responsible than others. Such a view has a
practical consequence where we recognize that not all individuals may enjoy
privilege in all aspects of life, in which case individuals with little autonomy in
general are not disincentivized to reject out of hand the notion that they do enjoy
some unfair advantages.
Yet there are other cases where, though one is a member of a group where
those with more power are responsible, one is not “just responsible” for things that
one quite literally has no functional control over. The U. S. did not evacuate all
Afghanis in time at the end of August 2021. Now, in what sense is Singapore
responsible for that? Not at all. In what sense is a farmer in the cranberry bogs of
Wisconsin responsible for that? Probably not at all (agnosticism may be our only
option here). As power tapers off and approaches zero, there is a binary between
responsible or not. There may not be a functional difference between Singapore
and the cranberry farmer, meaning there was nothing that they could have done
about it.27
What of the explanatory power or parsimony of collective accounts? We
do not have to go searching for the details for each and every actor within a group
precisely because power exists in classes. That is, all those on the floor of the

The reader may be surprised to find that I’ve invited a binary into my view, as I’ve made it a
goal to do away with binaries in this dissertation. But this is an issue about which I’m willing to
bite the bullet, because saying there is not a binary here would be absurd—that some who cannot
make any functional difference at all are responsible.
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assembly line who are not forepersons do not have a choice, they are a subset of
the set of the larger corporation. The middle management constitute another set
with a higher degree, culminating in a board of directors with the highest. We
can do the same for nations. We can do the same for economic classes—certain
sets of individuals enjoy the economic privilege (autonomy) to choose to
purchase an electric car and some do not. There may be no excuse for Bill Gates (I
do not know the status of his automobiles), some excuses whether totally
compelling or not for the middle class, and every excuse in the world for the
poor. Thus, the seeming messiness of a gradient view is easily resolvable by sets
of classes of gradients, just as students get “A’s” and not 93.000001% or
93.000002%. The point is that we can get as fine-grained as we want, but we don’t
have to.
2.4. Conscious Choice and Unawareness
So far, a lack of conscious choice and unawareness have not been explored
in any detail. It may be objected that:
(1) Some do not consciously choose to cause harms in which case they
cannot be held responsible.
(2) Some are unaware of the harms they cause in which case they cannot
be held responsible.
Per (1), if we do not consciously choose to cause harm, then we are not
responsible, because it is not something over which we had control. Case closed.
But a lack of conscious choice may not be relevant for some. That is, per (2), some
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may not know the relevant facts of the situation. They haven’t got a clue about
the harms they caused. But shouldn’t part of responsible agency be knowing
what it is we choose as well as the relevant facts of our choice context?
First, consider the plausibility of ignorance for those with power as an
excusing condition of responsibility. Let’s say the higher-ups at the car factory
were actually ignorant of the unreliability of the transmission and the CEO of the
car wash just did not know about the defective carwax. Given their power, they
really ought to have known because they have power, and we can hold them
responsible because they should have known better. The more power we have,
the more we need to be aware of our omissions. If we commit to not being aware,
then we are willfully evading responsibility, and perhaps denying the very idea
of responsibility. Equally seriously, we might also consider the fact that the
Supreme Court ought to have known the structural outcomes they solidified
were it the case that they pled ignorance. Finally, there are cases of active
ignorance, where here all I mean is that someone whose responsibility it is to
report wrongdoings actively goes out of her way to be unaware—one might
imagine a police officer telling a friend that she can’t hear talk of her friend’s
criminal behavior. There are all manner of cases where ignorance is not a valid
excuse—and all of them involve a person in power who ought to know better.
Lastly, what of those whose power does not seem to play a role in their
ignorance? Yet, consider Medina: a critical element of responsible agency is being
“minimally knowledgeable about one’s mind and one’s life, about the social

141
world and the particular others with whom one interacts, and about the
empirical realities one encounters” (2013, 127). Though his view falls within the
purview of racism, it provides a lens through which we can see that we are none
of us merely atomic individuals responsible for only ourselves, but that we are
connected to others in such a way that our actions have a broad impact (133ff.). It
seems not just that an individual must come to terms with this herself, but that
she must also see that she is networked with others and with society writ large.
The point is that thinking about what I have caused includes thinking about
what I have affected. So, unless we were to deny the idea of moral responsibility,
what we find is that in looking out for ourselves we are looking out, too, for
other individuals and groups—those affected by the actions we cause.
Conclusion
Earlier in the chapter privilege was a springboard for talk about
disproportionate power. After all, what is privilege but a kind of power, and
what is power but a kind of privilege? My thinking is that if we take “privilege”
in a broader sense than white privilege as is seen in the philosophy of race
literature, then in the continuum style of thinking of this chapter, there are
further depths to plumb where it comes to responsibility. That is, beyond the
continuum framework’s providing nuance in terms of who should be held to
account and by how much, it may provide nuance, also, to other senses of
“responsibility”, for instance, in our being able to take up responsibility and our
being able to do responsible actions. Outside privilege in the context of race, there

142
are degrees of privilege in being able to be responsible in other of life’s arenas: as a
consumer, in relation to the environment, and so on.
Consider the capacity to take up responsibility against the backdrop of
privilege. If we should no longer buy clothing made in sweatshops or from
manufacturers that leave a large carbon footprint, then it would seem that only
those with a surplus of economic privilege are able to take responsibility for
buying clothes from vendors that do not engage in those practices. Perhaps we
buy an organic cotton farm and make our own shirts, thus avoiding sweatshop
labor and leaving no carbon imprint. And those sufficiently motivated to
mitigate harm to the environment who buy electric cars can do so given their
economic capital. But some who are likewise motivated have little to no choice
but to buy the beater car, thus perpetuating environmental harm. They simply do
not have the means to buy the electric car.
This sort of thinking takes us to the capacity to do responsible actions. It
should be eye-opening that those who have a lesser degree of privilege
sometimes cannot do responsible actions—those without the means cannot buy
the organic cotton farm or the electric car. So perhaps, then, those with great
privilege who can buy the farm and the electric car owe more in terms of
undertaking responsible actions. In either case, we come full circle from the
capacity to take up responsibly and to do responsible actions to accountability. The
privileged may well be accountable for their lack of shouldering the burden of
responsibility. They bear a greater burden for society.
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Conclusion
Charting Out New Paths: Two Sites for Future Research
Were this dissertation to be abridged, its major identifiable theme would
be philosophy as amelioration. This theme ran through the foregoing pages both in
terms of philosophical analysis and of attempting to improve our lives and
practices. I’ve attempted, generally, to demonstrate amelioration’s force on how
both theory and praxis are conducted and construed in philosophical inquiry.
In chapter 2, I employed a re-tooled notion of “objectivity” that, at a
minimum, means general. How did that improve theory in the philosophy of race
and racism? The sense of “objective” I operated with coherently, non-reductively
unified the ideas of the literature. This allowed for a general view of various
perspectives in the literature, which in turn allowed for a basic idea of what
we’re talking about. And if the major views of racism can be unified, then we
have a general method to ameliorate racism—theory in the service of praxis.
In chapter 3, I hope to have shown that we needn’t be forced into
theoretically accepting either a social-structural or individualist lens through
which to understand racism. The upshot of doing so is that knowledgeable, antiracist whites must always confront the reality that social forces play out in their
individual minds—it is never safe to presume that one isn’t individually racist
nor that one is absolvable given the “transcendent” aspect of structural racism. I
explored this idea in a psychologically realistic way via overlooking, where
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ameliorating racism from the white perspective is an ongoing, but not hopeless,
project—theory, again, in service of praxis.
Chapter 4, in a theoretical move similar to chapter 3, re-framed
responsibility, arguing that we needn’t be forced to choose between
responsibility models divided into individual versus social camps. I argued that
we should instead locate responsibility on a power continuum, which provided a
realistic lens by which persons and groups are held to account without having to
explicitly delimit ourselves to one or the other. In being more generally
convincing, this might actually incentivize people to take responsibility where
they might not otherwise—theory, once more, in service of praxis.
But beyond rehearsing this dissertation’s path, the purpose of this
conclusion is to indicate some new directions borne out by the dissertation’s
themes. I want to consider something new, and offer a future research agenda
that isn’t simply reducible to the ideas already presented. Where can those ideas
go where they haven’t already been? Permit me to sketch here two sites for
further thinking, and why we should care about exploring them.
1. The Privilege of Responsibility
The first site for further thinking has to do with complicating the moral
idea of responsibility. Chapter 4 presented a framework for responsibility which
located it on a continuum of power. The idea was simple enough: the more
power we have, the greater our responsibility. In that chapter I used privilege as
a positive launchpad to explore power. But there is something more to explore
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beyond power, something new if the conversation were re-directed back to
privilege. What I’m interested in investigating is neither taking responsibility nor
being held to account for one’s privilege. Rather, the idea is to unpack the idea
that responsibility itself is a privileged affair. I want to develop a general position
according to which responsibility is asymmetrical, that it is a privilege
disproportionately available to the public. My thinking is that such a position is
supported by the material, socio-economic reality where privilege is involved in
the capacity to take up responsibility at all for oneself, one’s actions, and for
others. Doing good—i.e., doing responsible actions—is generally available only
to those who have the means to do good. A startling implication is that those with
privilege are more praiseworthy than those without it.
1.1. The Privilege of Taking Up Responsibility
One project that falls out of this line of thinking is an examination of the
privilege involved in being able to take up responsibility, that is, our capacity to
be responsible. Those with more material resources are far better positioned to
take responsibility, whereas those without resources may not have the capacity
to take responsibility at all. The material capital we have in some way determines
whether we can even be responsible, because it can limit our choices and the
control over what we can do. Call this the materiality of responsibility thesis. To
whom is the capacity open? Instead of answering such a question by turning to
the metaphysics of agency, how a person must be composed to be a viable
candidate for responsible agency, the idea is to turn away from metaphysics and
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turn towards socio-economic conditions. We needn’t look further than the
current state of the world to see how this idea plays out. It is a luxury to work
from home during the COVID-19 pandemic in order to mitigate the spread of the
coronavirus. But of course, some do not have the luxury to take responsibility for
themselves and their community in this case, having to continue work indoors
amongst others. The point is that the ability to take responsibility is limited by
privilege and, conversely, unbounded by it.
We should care about this because if it is true that there is real privilege in
taking up responsibility, then there are several odd implications that challenge
the very idea of responsibility and its practice. While it may be appealing to say
that responsibility is symmetrical, that it is more or less the same across the
board, it turns out that responsibility is asymmetrical. It is asymmetrical not only
in the sense of chapter 4 where some have more responsibility than others, but
also in the sense that some do not have the capacity, the material resources, to
engage in responsibility practices. That is, some have very little capacity, if at all,
to be responsible. And if one’s capacity to be a responsible agent depends on
one’s privileged status, then our social practice of holding agents to account,
blaming or praising them, is also privileged. We may not want to be so quick, for
example, to say that all unvaccinated persons during the pandemic are
blameworthy, as those in underserved predominately black and brown
neighborhoods may not have the ability to get vaccinated. Perhaps an aspect of
privilege is not asking the question, “Which unvaccinated persons are to blame?”
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1.2. The Privilege of Doing Good and of Praise
Another project follows from the materiality of responsibility thesis. The
thesis reveals that responsibility is a kind of commodity, that doing something
responsible—doing good—is generally open only to those who can “afford” it. If
the capacity to take up responsibility is privileged, then doing responsible actions
is also a matter of privilege. Working from home during the pandemic, buying
the electric car to mitigate environmental harm, shopping for clothes only at fair
trade stores so as to not support sweatshop labor—all of these undertakings are
available only to a sub-set of the population. So, doing some responsible actions
does not admit of equal opportunity. Not all can work from home or buy an
electric car or fair-trade clothing, and so on. The idea conjures up Socrates’
interrogation of Cephalus at the beginning of the Republic, the frustrated result of
which is that it is fairly easy to be a good person, to do good things, if one is
wealthy. But if doing responsible actions is a privilege, and we praise those who
do responsible actions, then praise too is privileged. Call this the privilege of praise
thesis, according to which if there is privilege involved in doing good, then the
privileged are seemingly more deserving of praise, a peculiar and inequitable
consequence.
We should find this consequence disquieting. If we think doing good
deserves praise, but this is only a live option for the privileged among us, then
the very idea of praise might rightly need re-framing as well. Should we think
that those with a high degree of privilege are entitled to a high degree of praise?
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If the privileged are sufficiently motivated enough to care about not supporting
low-wage labor, they do not have to eat their meals at fast food restaurants or
buy their books on Amazon.com, because they have the resources to source their
food from the upscale organic food market and shop at the local bookstore. Our
quotidian understanding of praise amounts to saying that Jeff Bezos and Bill
Gates have perhaps the greatest capacity to be praiseworthy. It amounts to
saying that the poor are less praiseworthy than the rich, that whites are more
praiseworthy than other racialized groups, and so on. These are hard
implications to swallow and should motivate a critical reappraisal of the material
reality of our praising practices.
2. The White Philosopher and the Aggressor/Oppressor Perspective
The second site for further thinking has to do with the role of the white
philosopher in the philosophy of race and racism and the aggressor/oppressor
perspective. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the seeds for investigating these topics. In
chapter 2, I raised the question of whether a white philosopher can be objective
in the philosophy race, and whether she has a role in the area. There I hope to
have established that it is possible to speak objectivity about racism in a way that
respects first-person perspectives. In chapter 3, I pivoted to a discussion of
racism from the perspective of the oppressor and showed what it is like to begin
from a position of relative competence and yet watch racism nevertheless unfold.
Can these seeds bear any further fruit?
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Permit me to frame a general position on these matters by speaking
autobiographically. What interests me, and what should be of interest to any
white person in this field, is the perspective of the oppressor and whether a
white philosopher has anything at all to say about race and racism, because that is
my situation. Do I belong in this field? Is my perspective of any use? My thinking
is that there is more to be learned about the moral psychology of white folk from
the white perspective, a theoretical enterprise in the service of ameliorative
results.
2.1. The White Philosopher Approaches Whiteness and White Racism
White philosophers have of course approached whiteness and white
racism. That is not new. But what I want to draw attention to are constellations of
views that are representatively expressed by the notion of white fragility
(DiAngelo 2011, 2018), the discomfort and denial whites feel in the face of racial
issues. While I do not think that white fragility as a phenomenon should be
jettisoned, I do think that the approach that undergirds it is not one that is likely
to change many hearts and minds of white folk. My suggestion is that views like
white fragility are too caught up in theory-not-in-the-service-of-praxis.
Developing a view where white moral psychology is reduced to a state of
constant vigilance about its own moral failings is likely to generate further white
fragility. Perhaps that is the point. But the issue is that white fragility becomes
something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, a “gotcha” theory of the white mind. Will
this galvanize the (white) public? That seems unlikely. While whites are certainly
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not morally exempt from putting in the work of self-awareness, there seems to be
too little onus on the practical reality of something like white fragility, a
simplistic psychology without much in the way of practical consequences.
The implication of thinking through white moral psychology in this way
is that we should have very little faith in the amelioration of racism, that it may
not be ameliorable at all. Even if we think the problem of racism will never be
solved, we should not lose faith in amelioration as a kind of regulative ideal. In
the spirit of chapter 2, getting descriptively clear first helps us prescribe more
effectively. Approaching white psychology from a moralistic starting point, as I
think white fragility does, likely does more to “turn off” whites than it does to
make things better for the oppressed. Shouldn’t that be our goal? Thus, my
thinking is that a more realistic psychology, with a non-moralistic starting point,
might better serve the goal of amelioration. A neutral theoretical approach in the
service of praxis, presenting white psychology convincingly, is a better strategy
for persuading the public—it may get them “on board” for real change.
2.2. Microaggressions from the Perspective of the Aggressor/Oppressor
The question of what a white philosopher can reasonably do in the
philosophy of race and racism may find an unexpected home in the literature on
microaggressions, those verbal or nonverbal slights (intentional or not) which
express negative messages to persons on the basis of their membership in a
marginalized group. Against the backdrop of theory-in-the-service-of-praxis
once again, how might the perspective of the white philosopher help here? That
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is, how might the perspective of the oppressor, or in the case of
microaggressions, the aggressor be of theoretical use for practically targeting
microaggressions?
The white philosopher’s role is of course limited. We cannot know
completely what it is like to be the target of a microaggression from the
standpoint of the oppressed. Neither can we speak to certain aspects of the harm
that is incurred. We cannot honestly begin from the perspective of the victim, as
we cannot prescribe the nature of others’ experiences outside our race (this seems
especially true in the case of white folk). So, what can the white philosopher do?
What I propose, in the spirit of overlooking, is to approach
microaggressions from the perspective of the white aggressor, not because the
victim’s perspective is ignorable, but because I am white. There is nothing wrong,
on its face, with taking up this perspective in the service of mitigating harms.
And in fact, this seems the right sort of role for the white philosopher, because
there is no pretending to have any perspective other than one’s own. There is a
legitimacy to an approach from the “inside” of whiteness that is not something to
shy away from, but rather, something to be embraced—namely that what whites
may consciously ascribe themselves to (“I’m an anti-racist”; “I’m ‘woke’ enough
not to engage in microaggressions”; and so on) is different than what they really
feel and perhaps talk about outside academic circles. To talk about overlooking is
to offer an honest appraisal that whites with education, training, and a morally
competent viewpoint really do think they aren’t racist and that’s the end of it.
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They’ve put in all the relevant work. Now, they may not say this aloud, but that
seems to be how it is from the “inside”. So, overlooking matters because it calls
that psychology to account.
It is from that neutral descriptive starting point, how white psychology
really is, that we can begin to make things better. Of course, “neutral” is not
meant deny that from the perspective of the oppressed, microaggressions are
aggressive. This program is not for the sake of the oppressor. But oppression is a
relation—if we want to relieve the oppressed, then the manifestations of how the
oppressor thinks and oppresses is clearly relevant. The point is that if we don’t
look through the perspective of the aggressor, we’ll miss out on a realism about
her psychology, and what we get is a subtler, greater range of the phenomenon.
In the style of overlooking, it is a diagnostic for those who don’t want to engage
in microaggressions from the perspective of the aggressor.
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